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TO PLEAD OR NOT TO
PLEAD: EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
STEVEN ZEIDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Following the advice of his counsel, Hernando Williams pleaded
guilty to murder, kidnapping, rape and robbery. He was sentenced by
a jury to death,' On appeal, Mr. Williams claimed that his guilty plea
was coerced and involuntary. At a post-verdict hearing, one of his
defense attorneys had testified in detail to what the Court of Appeals
described as the defense team's "methods of persuasion."2
As a response to our client's position, the four of us as well
as [the psychologist] attempted to persuade [sic] the defen-
dant that a plea of not guilty would be a mistake .. . . In this
case the psychological pressure and the sophisticated tactics used
with Hernando Williams to convince him to adopt our ap-
proach were unlike any other conversations I ever had with any
other client. Also, it goes without saying, that in this case there
were no plea bargaining offers from the State. All of the
psychiatric and psychological information which had been gathered
and developed by [ the doctors] was used by me and my associates
to compel Mr. Williams to accept our point of view. This consti-
tuted a unique form of coercion. We took advantage of our client,
maximizing the use of the information we had gathered for
a purpose other than which it was intended. Our strategy was
developed to accommodate us and not our client. There is no
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. B.A., 1078, State
University of New York at Albany; JD., 1981, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for
the insightful continents of Tony Amsterdam, Paul Clievigny, Mari Curbelo, Ronald Ellis, Monroe
Freedman, David Garland, Jim Jacobs, Tom Klein, Holly Maguigan, Rob Mandclbatim, Florian
Miedel, Ron Noble, Jerry Skolnick, David Stern, and Frank Upham. 1 thank Damaris Marrero for
providing invaluable administrative assistance, and I gratefully acknowledge the financial support
of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School
of Law.
I See Williams v. Chratis, 945 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1991) (pica entered in 1978).
2 Id. at 932.
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question that during this period (which lasted over a year) we
did not act in accordance with our client's wishes. Rather, we
used every means available to force him to change his plea. 5
The court denied the defendant's motion and observed that "Mr.
Williams' attorneys concluded that a guilty plea was in his best
interests and used verbal persuasion to convince [him] to plead
guilty . . . ' [a]dvice—even strong urging' by counsel does not invali-
date a guilty plea."'
Wesley Trahan pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to life
imprisonment, the maximum permissible sentences Mr. Trahan filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his plea was
involuntary and without the effective assistance of counsel:
[Defense counsel] explained that his practice was to advise
clients of the factual strength of the state's case in light of
applicable law and then to allow them to make their own
decisions as to how to plead to the extent they were capable. 6
Commenting on the attorney's neutrality when counseling clients
about the advisability of accepting a plea offer, Judge Goldberg
wrote in a concurring opinion that "this practice is certainly to be
commended in the general run of cases . . ." 7
Williams and Trahan present two vastly different counseling meth-
ods, yet in both cases the conviction by plea was upheld. Courts ap-
prove polar opposite approaches to counseling—utilizing "a unique
form of coercion" versus remaining neutral. The fundamental ques-
tion thus becomes what counseling obligations the Constitution re-
quires.
The importance of this inquiry is clear. There are presently a
record number of inmates in American penal institutions' At the end
3 Id, (emphasis added).
4
 Id, at 933 (quoting LMIZ V. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1327 (2d Cir. 1976)), The court went
on to note that the defendant's statements during his plea that the plea was voluntary and not
the result of any threats or promises were additional support for the conclusion that the plea was
not coerced. See id.; see also Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
5 See Trahan v. Estelle, 544 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977) (plea entered in 1969).
6 Id. at 1319 (Goldbctg, J., concurring).
7 Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring). judge Goldberg noted that in certain situations (i.e., where,
as in Trahan, the defendant was young and had met with the prosecutor in the absence of
counsel), it might be appropriate for the attorney to take a more active role. See id. at 1319-20.
8
 The nation's jail and prison incarceration rate has nearly doubled in the last ten years. See
BUREAU I:W .1[35110E STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, Nq 162843. At the end of 1996, 1,182,690
prisoners were under federal or state jurisdiction. This represents a 5% increase from 1995, but
is less than the average annual growth of 7.3% since 1990. There were an estimated 427 prison
inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents, up from 292 at the end of 1990. See id.
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of 1995, 5.3 million people were incarcerated, on probation or on
parole. 9 The vast majority of the convictions in these cases were the
result of plea bargains, 1 " where the defendants agreed to forego the
right to a trial" and to enter pleas of guilty in exchange for guaranteed
sentences or ranges of sentences. 12
The Sixth Amendment's and the Supreme Court's rulings in
Gideon v. Wainwrighr and Argersinger v. Hamlin15 guarantee that all of
those defendants had the right to be represented by counsel. The right
to counsel incorporates the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 6
Given the enormous number of people arrested and then convicted
by guilty plea, and the right of each of those individuals to the effective
assistance of counsel, it is critical to examine defense counsel's role in
the plea decision. What does the Constitution require with respect to
counseling a defendant during the plea bargaining process and the
decision whether to plead guilty? Are the parameters of counseling left
to defense attorneys' own deviceS so that some may adopt a neutral
stance while others may do everything within their power to convince
someone to accept a plea? Far too little attention has been focused on
this vital inquiry.
The effective-assistance-of-counsel standard has been the subject
of numerous articles, and many scholars deplore the quality of defense
• See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED SPATES, 1995 (1996).
°The Supreme Court has recognized plea bargaining as "an essential component of the
administration of justice." Santohelio v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also Illackledgc
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is
that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are bnportant components of this
country's criminal justice system,"). For proof of the prevalence of plea bargaining, see, e.g.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEVT or JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SurrisTics 512-13 (1992); BUREAU or JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BULLETIN,
FELONY SENTENCES IN TIM STATE COURTS 1992 (1995) (pleas account for 92% of all felony state
court convictions).
11
 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12 CHIC scholar defined plea bargaining as "the process by which the defendant in a criminal
case relinquishes his right to go to trial in exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence."
MiuroN IiEumaNN, PLEA BARGAINING (1978).
IN "III all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
14 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (providing that states must provide attorneys for indigent defendants
accused of felonies in state courts).
15 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that a defendant could not be incarcerated in any case unless
he or she had been provided counsel).
16 See, e.g., McMazin v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (defendants are 'entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel . . . [and! cannot be left to the mercies of incotnpetent counsel
"); Powell v, Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (counsel must not be appointed "under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid ill the preparation and trial of the case.").
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counsel in criminal cases. 17 In particular, commentators assail the state
of indigent defense and the inadequacy of the representation that poor
people accused of crime receive. 18 These articles often stress the de-
ficiencies of institutional defenders, due to insufficient funding 19 or
bureaucratic allegiances to other criminal justice personnel." Criticism
of defense counsel's advocacy has focused on trial representation. 2 '
The actual performance of the defense attorney in the counseling
process has been overlooked.
Defendants frequently raise ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on appeal." Typically, the defendant alleges deficiencies in the
preparation for or performance at trial. 23 Claims of inadequate trial
'I See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1973);
David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 Geo. LJ. 811 (1976); William J.
Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Repre-
sentation, 22 AM. Crum. L. Rev. 181, 201 (1984) ("[T)hcre are far too many defendants who are
represented by inadequate counsel . . . .").
19 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL. JUSTICE IN A
FREE SOeY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS (1988); SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., THE Ricur TO
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. 1-IAMLIN 1976; Richard Klein,
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 625 (1986); Michael McConville & Chester L
Minsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581
(1986-87). The number of articles concerned with indigent defense comports with the reality
that most criminal defendants arc represented by government-appointed counsel. See, e.g., 13u-
IREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE; 1996 (in 1992, about
80% of defendants charged with felonies in the 75 largest counties in the country were repre-
sented by government-supplied counsel); Paul C. Drecksel, The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense,
44 Aux. L. REV. 363, 367 11.21 (1991) (citing Jim Neuhard, Free Counsel, A Right Not a Charity,
14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 101, 109 (1986) ("In metropolitan communities, over 90% of
all criminal defendants cannot afford counsel.")).
19 See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Ass's', Tire OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973);
Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent
Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 532 (1988) (inadequate funding leads
to too few attorneys, excessive caseloads and substandard preparation); Klein, supra note 18.
29 See, e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooplation of a Profession, 1 LAw & SOC .Y REV. 15 (1967) (analyzing the defense attorney's
allegiance to the "organizational goals" and "bureaucratic priorities" of the criminal court);
HEUMANS, supra note 12.
21 See, e.g., Jake Dear, Adversary Review: An Experiment in Performance Evaluation, 57 DEN.
LJ. 401 (1980).
22 
"Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most—if not the most—common appeal
grounds asserted by convicted criminal defendants as appellants." Join: M. BURKOFF & Hom; L.
Hunsos, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1-3 (1994) (emphasis in original). The number
of reported state and federal cases in which the defendant claimed ineffective assistance on appeal
increased by 250% from 1985 to 1992. See id. at v. For compilations of ineffective assistance claims,
sec generally id.; LARRY FASSLER, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (1993).
25 See, e.g., Dorothy Linder Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 105, 144 (1978) (a survey of trial judges found that pretrial preparation
was the most common area of defense counsel incompetence).
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preparation focus on whether the attorney investigated the case,"
interviewed witnesses 25 or performed other important tasks in the
course of getting ready for trial." Allegations of ineffective assistance
at trial usually relate to the attorney's performance of advocacy skills
such as cross-examination," raising objections 28 or jury selection."
Ineffective assistance litigation in the plea context has also tended
to concentrate on trial-related issues. Common appellate issues include
whether, prior to the plea, defense counsel investigated the case,s°
interviewed witnesses31 and researched possible defenses."
Although there is no dearth of scholarly support for the validity
of many ineffective assistance claims," the courts have not been recep-
tive." Cases where questionable lawycring satisfied the effective assis-
tance standard are legion. There arc cases where ineffective assistance
claims failed even though counsel had little or no experience with
21 See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 15 F.3d 816, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1993); Schwander v. Black-
bunt, 750 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985); GaryGoodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 111 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 90-91 (1986)
(one of the major deficiencies of defense counsel is the failure to conduct adequate pretrial
investigation); Barbara R. Levine, Preventing Defense Counsel Error—An Analysis of SOME ineffective
Assistance . of Counsel Claims and Their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. Tor., L. Rs v.
1275, 1371 (1984) (the most frequent ineffective assistance claim is the failure to investigate).
23 See, e.g., Lento v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 1993); Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz, 915
F.2d 106, 113 (3d Cir. 1990); Ingrassia v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 1368, 1370 (8th Cir. 1990);
Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 402 (11th Cir. 1984); McNamara v. United States, 867 F. Supp.
369, 373 (ED. Va, 1994) (ineffective assistance claims commonly involve challenges to factual
research such as the interviewing of witnesses).
26 See generally Levine, supra note 24, at 1336-53.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Trcff, 924 F.2d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1991).
28 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993); Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d 38, 44 (2d
Cir. 1994); Levine, supra note 24, at 1357 (discussing the !Failure to object to inadmissible
evidence, improper prosecutorial arguments or erroneous jury instructions).
29 See, e.g., Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Simpson, 974
F.2d 845, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1992); White v. Singletary, 972 F,2d 1218, 1222-23 (11th Cir, 1992).
3° See, e.g., Levine, supra note 24, at 1343.
31 For a discussion of the need to prepare thoroughly prior to engaging in pica bargaining,
see generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 Cus:. L. REV. 73 (1995).
32 See id.
" See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 Was. & MARY BILL Or Rm. J. 91 (1995); Joseph D. Grano,
The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. 11.1:v. 1175, 1246 (1970)
("the problem of counsel's failure to investigate and prepare a defense is a real one").
34
 See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: T9ward a Checklist-Based Standard
for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 CEO. L.J. 413, 414 ti.11 (1988) (finding
only 4.3% of ineffectiveness claims substantiated by the circuit courts); Klein, supra note 18, at
632 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, The Association
of Trial Lawyers of America and the American Civil Liberties Union at 22, United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648 (1984) (of 4000 federal and state reported appellate decisions from 1970 to 1983,
only 3.9% of ineffective assistance claims were successful)).
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criminal law and only a brief time to prepare," was intoxicated," used
illegal drugs," had mental disabilities" or slept through parts of the
trial." It is abundantly clear that, as the court stated in Trahan, "it is
not difficult to receive a passing grade as effective counsel." 40
33
 See, e.g., Gronic, 466 U.S. at 663-75 (not ineffective assistance when defense counsel, who
had no previous jury trial and criminal law experience, had 25 days to prepare a case that took
the government four and one-half years to put together); United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278,
1281 (5th Cir. 1986) (not ineffective assistance even if no prior experience in criminal advocacy);
Avery v Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1985) (not ineffective counsel even though
appointed on the morning of trial).
'6 See, e.g., Burnett v, Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993) (even though defendant
alleged that counsel had been intoxicated during the trial and counsel entered an alcohol
treatment program after the trial, there were no specific instances where counsel's performance
was deficient); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (although defense counsel
admitted being an alcoholic and suffering from blackouts during the trial, there was no evidence
that it affected his representation of the defendant); Hernandez v, Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241,
245 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("Even if this court were to credit . Petitioner and his wife and determine
that the mere presence of alcohol on [counsel's] breath signified inebriation, Petitioner has not
shown how this condition caused [counsel] to render deficient legal representation or how this
state resulted in prejudice to Petitioner's case."); People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989)
(en bane) (it was undisputed that counsel was an alcoholic and consumed large amounts of
alcohol each day of the trial, but defendant failed to prove that counsel's performance was
deficient).
37 See, e.g., Berry v. King, 765 F.2c1 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) ("IT] he fact that an attorney used
drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim. The critical inquiry is
whether ... counsel's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced the
defendant." (emphasis in original)); Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1984) (even
though counsel admitted that he had a drug problem and was convicted for marijuana possession
shortly after the trial, there was no showing of ineffective assistance); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d
1182, 1187 (Mont. 1990) ("[A]bsent any specific errors or conduct identified in the trial that
affected the trial's outcome, [counsel's] cocaine abuse is irrelevant to the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel.").
38
 See, e.g., McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 534 (4th Cir. 1990) (although counsel was on
medication and receiving treatment for depression and severe migraines, and was hospitalized
several times during the trial, the defendant did not show that this affected counsel's ability to
render adequate legal assistance); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1987) (even though
there was evidence of counsel's mental instability, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance was
properly denied without a hearing); Buckclew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 520-21 (5th Cir.
1978) (no adequate showing of specific prejudice resulting from counsel's alleged infirmities),
39
 See, e.g., United States v. Petersen, 777 F.2d 482, 481 (9th Cir. 1985) (allegation that counsel
was sleeping during trial was not sufficiently made out); McFarland v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505
n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (not ineffective assistance even though counsel slept though parts
of the trial; the court opined that perhaps co-counsel let the attorney sleep as a strategic choice
in order to gain the jurors' sympathy for the defendant); Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456,
456-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (even though three jurors testified that they observed the attorney
dozing and the trial judge found that counsel had slept during the trial, the application for a
writ of habeas corpus was denied). But see Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir.
1984) (court found ineffective assistance where counsel slept through substantial parts of the
trial).
10 544 F.2d at 1316 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths
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The question of trial-related activities has been overemphasized.
It is time to focus on the constitutional requirements of counseling
criminal defendants. What must defense counsel do in order to satisfy
the constitutional mandate of effective assistance of counsel in the
context of the acceptance or rejection of a plea?
The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Boria v. Keane addresses this crucial question. This case's
holding and analysis have profound implications for the caliber of
representation proVided to all criminal defendants, as well as for long-
standing clinical legal educational notions of client-centered counsel-
ing.° Oscar Boria was convicted 'after a jury trial and sentenced to
twenty years to life imprisonment. He moved to set aside his conviction,
claiming that his attorney, in failing to advise him to accept an offered
plea bargain of one to three years incarceration, did not provide
effective assistance of counsel. 43
Defense counsel readily admitted that he never counseled the
defendant whether or not to accept the plea—a decision, in his view,
for a defendant to make." He did, however, discuss the plea repeatedly
with the defendant, point out the implications of rejecting it, review
the suppression hearing issues and inform the defendant that in his
view the chances of prevailing at trial were slim. 45 According to defense
counsel, the defendant steadfastly maintained his innocence, and told
him that he would not plead guilty, especially if a plea included a jail
sentence."
Granting the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
court of appeals held that the Constitution requires that defense coun-
and the Injustice of Death.. A Critique of Death 'Penalty Habeas Corpus, 29 U. RICH. L, REV, 1327,
1362 (1995) (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must have had "truly
abysmal" lawyering),
41 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996).
42 By "client-centered" counseling, I refer to the model proposed originally in DAVID A.
BINDER & SUSAN C, PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (1977). Although others have delineated aspects of client-centeredness, see, e.g., THOMAS
L. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976), the Binder and Price
text has been the most influential within clinical legal education. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 504 (1990). For an
analysis of client-centered counseling, see infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
44 Post-conviction hearing on defense motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on the
ground, among others, of ineffective assistance of counsel. February 26-28, 1992 (transcript on
file with author). Counsel's approach is consistent with a traditional view of client-centered
counseling. See discussion infra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
45 1d. at 15, 18, 27-29, 42-44.
46 Id. at 10.
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sel provide an informed opinion on whether to plead guilty or go to
tria1.47 The court ruled that the defendant had a "constitutional right
to be advised whether or not the offered bargain 'appeared to be
desirable.'"48 Because the defense attorney never actually advised his
client whether or not he should accept the plea offer, he failed to
provide the requisite effective assistance of counsel.
In order to appreciate the magnitude of the court's holding, one
need only contrast the actions of counsel in Boria with those of the
attorneys in some of the more notorious cases where claims of ineffec-
tive assistance were denied. The attorney in Boria was not drunk or on
drugs. He did not fall asleep during court proceedings. He was expe-
rienced in criminal law and had ample time to prepare." He met with
his client on many occasions, spelled out the charges, the conse-
quences of a plea, the likelihood of success at pretrial suppression
hearings and at the trial itself, and yet a court found that his conduct
amounted to one of the rare cases of ineffective assistance because he
did not advise his client whether or not to accept the plea offer. He
was judged to be ineffective solely on the basis of deficient counseling.
In fact, the opinion states emphatically, "Hit would be impossible to
imagine a clearer case of a lawyer depriving a client of constitutionally
required advice."" The undeniable message is that the attorney's con-
stitutional counseling obligations have come to the forefront and taken
on increased significance. Bona portends that defense lawyers must
reevaluate their approaches to counseling, and that ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel litigators need to recognize an under-utilized compo-
nent of competent representation.
Boria is also significant in the challenge it. presents to prevailing
themes in clinical legal scholarship. A dominant issue in clinical legal
education is the attorney's role in the counseling process. Scholars
who advocate client-centered counseling emphasize the value of client
autonomy.51 They describe a type of legal counseling that is premised
on the assumption that clients should be the decisionmakers in their
cases.52 In an early and very influential formulation, Professors David
47 See Boria, 99 F.3d at 497.
4g Id. at 498 (quoting Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1992)).
49 See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
5°
 Boria, 99 F.3d at 497.
51 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 512 ("The core argument supporting client decision-
making is that it enhances the client's individual autonomy."); John K. Morris, Power and Respon-
sibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
781, 782, 809 (1987).
52 See Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 507 ("Client-centered counseling may be defined as a legal
counseling process designed to foster client-decisionmaking.").
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Binder and Susan Price suggested that in order to avoid influencing
the client improperly, the attorney should 'make every effort to com-
municate neutrality,"" and should, except in certain limited circum-
stances, decline to give an opinion regarding the appropriate decision
even if the client asks directly." To the extent that the analysis and
holding in Bolin mandate a different, constitutionally required role for
defense counsel in criminal cases, clinical legal scholars must reassess
their approaches to client counseling.
In this Article, I explore the defense attorney's constitutional
obligations to clients in the context of the decision whether to plead
guilty or to go to trial. I examine the implications of the Second
Circuit's analysis in Borc' for courts' evaluations of effective assistance
of counsel arid for clinical legal scholarship's formulations of client-
centered counseling.
Part I describes the development of the effective assistance of
counsel doctrine and its relation to client counseling. Part II analyzes
the concept of client-centered counseling and its implications for an
attorney's role in advising clients, concentrating on clinical legal schol-
ars' attempts to apply client-centered counseling to clients in criminal
cases. Part III evaluates in greater detail the history arid holding of
Boria: a curious succession of opinions in the case evidences the court's
struggle to define an attorney's constitutional obligations when coun-
seling a client. I analyze the effect of the Court of Appeals's final
opinion in Boria on the provision of services to defendants in criminal
cases, and on the continued viability of traditional definitions of client-
centered counseling.
Part IV argues that the final, published holding in Boria did not
go far enough to ensure that defense attorneys provide the effective
assistance of counsel. Rather, the court's original opinion—one impos-
ing an obligation on criminal defense attorneys to advise their clients,
whether or not they are asked, on the wisdom of accepting or rejecting
a plea, and also to try to persuade their clients to accept their advice—
was more likely to breathe life into the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance.
53 1-kr:DER & PRICE, supra note 42, at 166.
5I See id. at 187-88, 198-200.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND ITS APPLICATION TO
COUNSELING DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
For the past sixty-five years, the right to counsel has been under-
stood to incorporate the right to the effective assistance of counsel. In
Powell v. Alabama," the ,Court considered the timing of the appoint-
ment of counsel and held that counsel must not be appointed "under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case." 66 Almost three decades ago, in
McMann v. Richardson, 57 the Court ruled that defendants arc "entitled
to the effective assistance of competent counsel . . . [and] cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel." 5 B
Following the McMann decision, many convictions were chal-
lenged on the basis of counsel's failure to provide effective assistance.
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court in the form of stand-
ards for assessing whether a defendant received the effective assistance
of counsel, appellate courts employed a variety of tests. At one time,
the query was whether counsel's performance rendered the trial a
"mockery of justice."5' Eventually, most courts rejected the "mockery
of justice" analysis. The majority viewed the correct analysis to be
whether the lawyer's conduct measured up to that of a "reasonably
competent attorney." 6° In 1983, the Second Circuit became the last
federal court of appeals to replace the "farce and mockery" standard
with a "reasonable competency" test. 6 '
Despite the evident struggle in the courts of appeals to define
effective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court did not address the
55 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
56 Id. at 71.
57 597 U.S. 759 (1970).
58 Id. at 771.
59 See, e.g., 13ottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiarn); Coficld
v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S. 472
(1959); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) ("A lack of effective assistance
of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the
proceedings a farce and mockery of justice."); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
6° See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States
v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.
1976) ("[T1 dal counsel fails to render effective assistance when he Isicl does not exercise the
customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar
circumstances.").
61 Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[Ti he time has come to
declare that 'effective' assistance means 'reasonably competent assistance,' which we regard as
shorthand for the standard that the quality of defense counsel's representation should be within
the range of competence reasonably expected of attorneys in criminal cases.").
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issue until Strickland v. Washington.''' In the face of mounting numbers
of ineffective assistance challenges, and a growing body of literature
criticizing the state of trial advocacy generally° and of advocacy in
criminal courts particularly,64 the Court declined to delineate standards
illuminating the component parts of effective assistancc. 65 Instead, the
Court set up a two-pronged test for reviewing claims that counsel's
assistance was ineffective. The defendant must show (1) that the attor-
ney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness,"6" and (2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.'"37
Among the vast number of claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the focus is usually on activities related to trial.° The high inci-
dence of trial-related claims is at first blush surprising. The overwhelm-
ing majority of criminal cases arc resolved by plea bargain.° There arc,
however, explanations for the many post-trial opinions. For one thing,
trials arc more easily susceptible to appellate review than are decisions
to plead guilty. 7" Trials yield full transcripts. 7 ' Secondly, reviewing a
62 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
63 See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE. & GORDON HERMAN r, TILE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE
FEDERAL Coutrrs (1978); Maddi, supra note 23.
64 See supra notes 17-18.
65 The Court held that "1wIlien a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of
counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. More specific guidelines arc not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment
refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance." Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Justice Brennan wrote, "With respect to the performance standard, I
agree with the Court's conclusion that a 'particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct'
would be inappropriate." Id. at 703 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Scholars have expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense
Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 CoLum. L. REV. 9,86 (1986) ("I believe that at
this stage of development of the law on ineffective assistance, the difficulty of articulating a
comprehensive list of duties justifies the Court's reluctance to constitutionalize any specific
directives to counsel."). Justice Marshall, on the other hand, criticized the majority's refusal to
delineate specific standards and praised the Eleventh Circuit for its "sound attempt to develop
particularized standards designed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
67 Id. at 694.
68 See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10-12.
7° See, e.g., Albert W. Alschttler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 149,149 (1986) ("[ A] plea negotiation system insulates
attorneys front review and often makes it impossible to determine whether inadequate repre-
sentation has occurred ...."); Berger, supra note 65, at 65 ("LOlften the sins of counsel are
buried in guilty pleas . . . .").
71 See, e.g., Coodpaster, supra note 24, at 81 (IT] he ineffective assistance problem is much
harder to reach in guilty plea cases because there is no evidentiary record front which to assess
counsel's alleged failings . . . .").
852	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:841
claim of ineffectiveness at trial generally involves evaluating concrete
or objective actions, such as, for example, whether counsel prepared
adequately (i.e., investigated, researched, interviewed witnesses, filed
motions, etc.), and/or performed competently (i.e., cross-examined
witnesses, made a closing statement, etc.) Y' Contrast that inquiry with
an examination of the adequacy of the attorney's counseling. Not only
is counseling less tangible, but it is also harder to reconstruct after the
fact. There is also a sense that representing someone who ends up
pleading guilty is less demanding, or requires less expertise, than
representing someone at a trial."
When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the court
must examine whether the plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently entered." The year after Strickland, in Hill v. Lockhart, 75 the
defendant alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary due to the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleged that his attor-
ney provided him with erroneous information regarding his parole
eligibility date, and that he relied on this inaccurate information when
he decided to plead guilty. The Supreme Court held that the ineffec-
tive assistance standard enunciated in Strickland was applicable to
claims arising from the plea process." In order to prevail, a defendant
must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial."" The Court concluded that there was no
evidence that the defendant would have insisted on a trial if he had
received accurate information, and therefore the defendant failed to
show the necessary prejudice.
An examination of the contours of effective assistance of counsel
in cases where the defendant has pleaded guilty illuminates the de-
'2 The record on these claims will likely have been developed at a hearing on post-verdict
motions.
" See, e.g., Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Reasonably effective
assistance is an easier standard to meet in the context of a guilty plea than in a trial, but counsel
still must render competent service.").
74 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) ("The standard was and remains
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant.").
75 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
"Id. at 57 ("Although our decision in Strickland v. Washington dealt with a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding, and was premised in part on the
similarity between such a proceeding and the usual criminal trial, the same two-part standard
seems to us applicable to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the plea process.").
77 Id. at 58. The Court's stated purpose for requiring a showing of prejudice was to promote
the finality of guilty pleas, See id.
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fense attorney's counseling obligations. When do a defense attorney's
actions render a plea involuntary, unknowing or unintelligent? To
focus the inquiry, assume that defense counsel completed a thorough
investigation. Assume further that the attorney spoke with witnesses,
researched the legal issues, and conveyed the offer to the defendant,
and that the lawyer was not overburdened by inadequate resources and
divided loyalties. The critical question heretofore left unexamined is
what is the lawyer's role—the constitutional obligation—in the deci-
sion whether to plead guilty or go to trial.
Clearly, the defendant has the "ultimate authority" as to whether
to plead guilty." The issue then, properly framed, is whether defense
counsel may, should or must advise a client, or offer any opinion, as
to what decision the client should make, regardless of whether the
client specifically asks for advice. Consider as well the even more
controversial question of whether defense counsel may, should or must
attempt to persuade the client to accept her advice.
A. Guilty Pleas
In many cases, defendants claim that, because they did not receive
effective assistance of counsel, their pleas were not voluntary, knowing
and intelligent." In analyzing these claims, appellate courts focus on
whether the attorney's actions were within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.8° If not, the courts examine
whether the defendant would have gone to trial but for the deficient
performance of counsel.'"
1. Inaccurate Information
Often the alleged ineffectiveness involves claims that the attorney
provided inadequate information to the defendant regarding the na-
ture of the charges, possible defenses or the range of allowable sen-
tences. The crux of the issue is whether the attorney's statements in
the course of counseling the client amounted to inaccurate factual
information, insufficient information or an inaccurate opinion or pre-
diction. The core of the defendant's argument is that the ineffective
assistance—the provision of deficient information—was what induced
78Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (the accused has the "ultimate authority" to
decide whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf or take an appeal).
79 See supra notes 74-76.
"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
81 See id. at 694; mg 474 U.S. at 59.
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him to enter a plea, and therefore the plea was not voluntary, knowing
and intelligent.
For example, in Cooks u United Slates,82
 the defense attorney in-
formed the defendant that he faced sixty years in prison, ten years on
each of the six counts in the indictment, if he were convicted after
trial. Defense counsel advised the defendant that he should therefore
accept the offer of ten years on a plea to only one count. The defen-
dant decided to accept the offer and pleaded guilty. In fact, only one
count of the indictment was legally valid, and as a result, the defendant
was facing only a ten-year prison sentence. In finding the attorney's
performance to be ineffective, the court addressed the nature of the
counseling requirements in criminal cases. The court stated that "clair-
voyance" was not a necessary feature of effective representation, but
that:
[a]lthough counsel need not be a fortune teller, he must be
a reasonably competent legal historian. Though he need not
see into the future, he must reasonably recall (or at least re-
search) the . . . controlling Supreme Court precedents which
demonstrate unequivocally that defendant could not possibly
receive a total sentence of 60 years on the indictment . . . .
Effective counsel should have been aware of and advised the
defendant of, at a minimum, the maximum—that is, the
maximum penalty as the law was then understood."
A more difficult question arises when counsel's information is not
inaccurate, but rather, incomplete. In People v. Thew," the defendant
pleaded guilty and received life without parole, the maximum permis-
sible penalty. In order to determine whether defense 'counsel was con-
stitutionally ineffective, the court examined whether the plea was vol-
untary and knowing, and observed that "[t]he question is not whether
a court would, in retrospect, consider counsel's advice to be right or
wrong, but whether the advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."" Although defense counsel
did not provide any inaccurate information, the court found him to
be ineffective. The court noted that there was a question whether the
82
 4 61 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 532; see also O'Tuel v. Osborne, 706 F.2d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 1983); Stradcr v. Garrison,
611 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1979); Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1975)
(defense counsel's erroneous calculation of the maximum allowable sentence held to be ineffec-
tive assistance rendering the plea involuntary).
84 506 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
85 Id. at 552.
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defendant was made aware of the nature of the charges, the conse-
quences of a plea and the availability of possible defenses. Therefore
the plea was not the result of a "sufficiently informed choice that
constituted a voluntary and knowing act.""
Harder still is the situation where defense counsel offers solely an
opinion, the defendant relies on it and it turns out to be wrong. Courts
analyze whether defense counsel's prediction, albeit wrong, was unrea-
sonable.° In Slate v. DiFrisco,w3 the defendant pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to death. He claimed that he was misinformed regarding
the likelihood of a death sentence, and that he pleaded guilty on the
basis of defense counsel's opinion that the court would not enter a
death sentence on a guilty plea. Defense counsel testified that, indeed,
he "never thought for a second" that the court would impose the death
penalty." The court determined that this was an opinion as opposed
to a promise or guarantee, and that erroneous sentencing predictions
did not warrant vacating guilty pleas where the prediction was wrong
but not unreasonable." After an analysis of the strength of the prose-
cution's case, the court held that although defense counsel's predic-
tion was erroneous, it was not unreasonable.g'
A plea will not be overturned merely because a defendant pleaded
guilty based on defense counsel's inaccurate prediction. The linchpin
88 Id. at 555.
87 See, e.g., Taw v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (the issue is whether counsel's
assistance was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases").
88 645 A.2d 734 (N.J. 1994).
89 Id. at 744.
9° See id. at 745; see also Little v. Allsbrook, 731 F.2(1. 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1984) ("An attorney's
'bad guess' as to sentencing does not justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea and is no reason to
invalidate a plea."); United States v. Hollis, 718 F.2d 277, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1983).
91 The court ruled that the erroneous prediction did not render the plea involuntary or
unknowing, nor did it amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d at 745;
see also Chichakly v, United States, 920 F.2d 624, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Stout v. United
Suites, 508 F.2d 951, 953 (6th Cir. 1975) ("A plea is not rendered involuntary merely because a
prediction that a guilty plea will result in a light sentence does not come true.")). The court in
Chichakly noted further that a "mere inaccurate prediction, standing alone ... does not constitute
ineffective assistance." 926 F.2d at 630 11.11; see also United States v. Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 494
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1990); People v. Jones,
579 N.E.2d 829, 840-41 (111. 1991); cf. United States v. Wilson, 922 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1991)
("There are two strands of argument here—a due process argument, that the pleas were invol-
untary, and also a sixth amendment argument, that [counsel] provided ineffective assistance.
These arguments arc doctrinally distinct. Effective assistance from counsel 'within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,' will usually guarantee a knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary plea—but not always." (internal citations omitted)); Berger, supra note 65, at
111 ("Regardless whether the claim is couched in terms of involuntariness or ineffectiveness, the
prisoner is making the same complaint—that grossly deficient representation induced him to
enter a plea of guilty.").
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is whether the prediction was reasonable. Compare counsel's inaccu-
rate predictions with her provision of incorrect information (for ex-
ample, advising the defendant that he is facing sixty years when the
maximum is only ten), or her failure to provide sufficient information
for the defendant to make an informed choice. While an erroneous
prediction could still be deemed to be reasonable, it is more difficult
to imagine situations where providing inaccurate or insufficient infor-
mation is defensible. it is also important to recognize that although
these cases involve issues that arise in the course of counseling about
the case generally, as opposed to the specific issue of counseling the
defendant whether to accept or reject a plea, they arc often related—
defense counsel could well provide inaccurate information and then
recommend that the defendant plead guilty as a result.
2. Coercion
Other plea cases examine the limitations on counsel's efforts to
convince a client to plead guilty. Put another way, what does it take to
render a plea involuntary because it is the result of defense counsel's
coercion? When do defense counsel's efforts to convince the defen-
dant to accept a plea become ineffective assistance? Surely, this is the
most contentious aspect of ineffective assistance litigation in the plea
context. The perception exists among many, if not most, indigent
defendants that their lawyers arc interested only in getting them to
plead guilty. 92
 How far is an attorney permitted to go in attempting to
persuade the client to plead guilty?
Several courts' of appeals decisions reveal that attorneys arc given
a wide berth. In Iaea v. Sunn,9
 in order to convince the defendant to
plead guilty, defense counsel told her client that his chances of acquit-
tal were slight, that if convicted he would be subject to mandatory min-
imum sentencing laws and that if he pleaded guilty there was a good
chance of getting probation and an "almost zero" chance of getting an
extended sentence." When the defendant still did not appear receptive
to pleading guilty, defense counsel threatened to withdraw from the
case. She testified, "I took pride in myself as an attorney and that I
would never allow a client to hurt himself . . . . I had allowed
him to go to trial, I would have done him a disservice so that if he
insisted on going to trial another attorney would handle it because it
92
 See, e.g., Steven Zeidinan, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student
Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 908 n.224 (1996).
99 800 F.26 861 (9th Cir. 1986).
94 See id. at 863.
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would be against my conscience to a client not to take a deal and go
through a trial, get convicted, and face the extended term.'K15 Ulti-
mately, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life impris-
onment. The defendant then claimed that his counsel had been inef-
fective and that his plea was involuntary.'}''
The court found that counsel's performance was deficient because
it was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases. 97 Specifically, the court noted that defendant was not
subject to the minimum sentencing statute as defense counsel thought,
and that counsel's advice that probation was likely and that the chances
of an extended term were practically non-existent was faulty. The court
observed that mere inaccurate predictions do not constitute ineffective
assistance, but the "gross mischaracterization" of the likely outcome,
combined with the erroneous advice on the possible effects of going
to trial, fell below the level of competence required of defense attor-
neys." The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether there was any prejudice (i.e., that but for counsel's
errors, the defendant would have gone to trial), and whether the plea
was rendered involuntary by defense counsel's threat to withdraw."
Interestingly, the court was concerned with the coercive nature of
defense counsel's comments only insofar as they referred to a threat
to withdraw from the case. The other aspects that appeared coercive
in nature (i.e., counsel's statements about what decision she would
"allow" her client to make) went uncriticized.
In contrast, defense counsel in Uresli v. Lynaughm negotiated a
thirty-five year plea bargain, down from an original sixty-year offer.
When he told his client of the offer, his client indicated that he wanted
a few days to think it over. Defense counsel feared that the offer would
be withdrawn and that jailhouse lawyers would advise the defendant to
his detriment, so he told his client that "if he did riot accept the
recommended thirty-five (35) year plea on that day he, the attorney,
99 Id, (emphasis added).
99 For discussion of the relationship between ineffectiveness and involuntariness, see supra
note 91.
97 See laea, 800 F.2d at 865.
98 Id.
One scholar has argued that counsel should not be permitted to withdraw or threaten to
withdraw from representing a client when the client declines to accept the attorney's advice. See
Albeit W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 VALE L. J. 1179, 1310 (1975)
("A defense attorney should neither withdraw nor threaten to withdraw from a case because his
client has refused to enter the plea that the attorney has recommended. Professional codes
should, in my view, be revised to make this action grounds for professional discipline.").
"0 821 F.2d 1099 (5111 Cir. 1987).
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would request permission . . . to withdraw . . . .1)101 Defense counsel
admitted that he did "use what persuasion he could reasonably muster
to convince [the defendant] to plead guilty." 1 °2 Even though defense
counsel initiated the same-day ultimatum and admitted using whatever
persuasion he could in order to convince the client to plead guilty,
including threatening to withdraw from the case, the court found that
the plea was not involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court stated that "[w] e have here an attorney who on the record
is acting in good faith and affording sound representation when he
decides that a client should plead guilty under a plea bargain." 103 The
court went on to state that "Where is no evidence that in any other
way the advice to Uresti as to the plea bargain fell short of the requisite
level of thoroughness and professional competence required." 1 °4 Al-
though the tactics used to convince the client to plead guilty seem
heavy-handed, the court focused instead on the reasonableness of the
advice itself, and determined that it was not unreasonable for counsel
to urge a plea.
Perhaps the clearest example of the courts' willingness to allow, if
not condone, defense counsel's extreme efforts to convince a client to
plead guilty can be found in Williams v. Chrans.'" In the face of clear
and unequivocal testimony by defense counsel that he and his col-
leagues "used every means available" to "force" the defendant to plead
guilty,'°6 the court concluded that the plea was voluntary. Quoting La
Conte v. Dugge-r,m the court observed that "[s]imply because the [de-
fendant] was subjected to pressure from sources not associated with
the state or prosecutors does not mean that [the defendant's] guilty
plea was necessarily involuntary. It is not an uncommon occurrence
that a criminal defendant is pressured to some extent by co-defendants,
friends and relatives. These types of influences are inevitable and un-
avoidable." 108 Implicitly equating the inevitable and unavoidable pres-
sure of co-defendants, family and friends with that of defense counsel,
the court went on to note simply that "Mr. Williams' attorneys con-
cluded that a guilty plea was in his best interests and used verbal
persuasion to convince their client to plead guilty."'° 9 As to the limits
101 Id. at 1101.
102 id .
1 " Id. at 1102.
I" Id.
1°5945 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1991).
1 °6
 Id. at 932; see supra notc 3 and accompanying text.
107 847 F.2d 745 (11th Cir. 1988).
100 Williams, 945 F.2d at 933 (quoting Lo Cale, 847 F.2d at 753).
1 °5 /d.
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of how far an attorney can go before their counseling, or "verbal
persuasion," rises to the level of coercion, the court held only that
[a] dvice—even strong urging' by counsel does not invalidate a guilty
plea."' l"
Although it is not constitutionally required, the law thus permits
(if not condones) defense counsels' going well beyond merely advising
their clients to accept a plea offer. Attorneys are given wide latitude in
their efforts to influence their clients to plead guilty. Attempts to
persuade, even those that amount to "strong urging," are acceptable,
and rarely will such efforts result in a finding that the defendant's plea
was involuntary. As the court observed in United States v. Wilson," t
[a] drnittedly, it is not easy to tell when a plea has been un-
lawfully coerced. Distinguishing coercion, of the constitution-
ally offensive kind, from sound anodyne advice, which raises
no constitutional concerns but just as surely pressures pleas,
is difficult. In any guilty-plea system, pricks, prods, and provo-
cations—whether from a lawyer, a mother, a father, a friend
or anybody else—will frequently steer a defendant's thoughts,
in that sense "coercing" pleas. But not every piece of advice
or pressure From a private party amounts to unconstitutional
coercion.' 12
3. Neutrality
At the other extreme is the situation where defense counsel offers
no advice on the wisdom of a plea and the defendant opts to plead
guilty. For many criminal defense attorneys, this neutrality is surely a
reaction to the studies that document defendants' negative reactions
to being told what to do by their lawyers." 5 For other defense attorneys,
this method of counseling is premised on notions of fostering client
autonomy and empowerment." 4 And still others are no doubt moti-
vated by fear of lawsuits or allegations of inisconduct. 115 The constitu-
110 Id. (quoting Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1327 (2d Cir. 1976)). The court went on
to note that the defendant's statements during his plea that the plea was voluntary and not the
result of any threats or promises, were additional support for the conclusion that the plea was
not coerced. See id.; see also Miles v. Dorsey, 61 E3d 1459, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995),
111 922 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1991).
112 Id. at 1341; see also Alschuler, supra note 99, at 1309 ("(TJhe line between advice and
coercion seems virtually non-existent in the guilty-plea system.").
"3 See infra note 200.
II' See infra notes 228-30.
11G For a discussion of other possible rationales for attorney neutrality, see infra notes 396-407
and accompanying text.
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tional question that arises is whether a defendant received effective
assistance when the attorney did not offer an opinion on the advisabil-
ity of accepting a plea and the defendant's decision to plead guilty was
arguably ill-advised (i.e., the defendant pleaded guilty to the highest
charge and received the maximum sentence).
Several cases from the Fifth Circuit have considered this issue in
detail. In Walker v. Caldwell, 16 among the factors resulting in a finding
of ineffective assistance was the attorney's failure to advise an illiterate
defendant whether or not to plead guilty. The court stated that the
effective assistance of counsel requires that the attorney "actually and
substantially assist his client in deciding whether to plead guilty."" 7 A
few years after Walker, the Fifth Circuit again addressed the constitu-
tional requirements for counseling criminal defendants. In Trahan v.
Estelle,] ]8 defense counsel testified that "his practice was to advise clients
of the factual strength of the state's case in light of applicable law and
then to allow them to make their own decisions as to how to plead to
the extent they were capable.""g The seventeen-year-old defendant
pleaded guilty and received a life sentence, the maximum possible
sentence had he been convicted after trial. The court of appeals re-
manded the case for consideration of the issues of voluntariness and
effectiveness of counsel. Judge Goldberg, in a concurring opinion,
attempted to explicate the constitutional requirements of counsel's
role in the plea decision. Judge Goldberg wrote that the defense attor-
ney's practice was to be "commended in the general run of cases,' ,120
but that courts must "be alert to circumstances that call for counsel
to impart to his client more than an explanation of the factual case,
the nature of the charges, and the benefits and burdens of pleading
guilty."121 In those cases, "it may be incumbent upon [the] attorney to
go beyond a relatively passive characterization of the state's case to a
more active ferreting out of the defendant's reasons for agreeing to
plead guilty. 99122
The very next year, in Jones v. Estelle,'" the Fifth Circuit was again
confronted with a situation where a defendant pleaded guilty and then
complained that his attorney offered no advice on the wisdom of that
1111 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973).
111 1d. at 224,
118 544 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977).
119 1d. at 1319 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
129 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1320.
12 584 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1978).
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decision. On the morning of trial, the prosecutor presented defense
counsel with the statement of a witness who discredited his client's
claim of self-defense. Defense counsel showed the statement to the
defendant, explained the effect that it had on his defense, explained
the possible sentence after trial compared to the prosecutor's plea
offer and left the final decision up to the defendant. The defendant
cited judge Goldberg's concurrence in Trahan and claimed that coun-
sel was ineffective for failing to advise him what to do. The court held
that Trahan sanctioned specifically this sort of counseling, and that
only in "special circumstances" is counsel required to take a more
active role.'" The court ruled that counsel's assistance enabled the
defendant to make an informed and conscious choice between trial
and a guilty plea, and that more in the nature of advising the defendant
whether or not to accept the offer was not required.
Decisions of other courts echo the same theme; the attorney is not
required to counsel a client against a plea even if it appears that a plea
is not, by some objective measure, the best result. In People v. Slewarl, 125
the defendant pleaded guilty and received life imprisonment without
parole, the highest permissible sentence. The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan reversed the lower court's finding that the defendant had received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent argued that defense coun-
sel has an obligation to try to prevent the client from entering a plea
of this nature: "[Plleading guilty to a life without parole offense,
Michigan's equivalent of the death penalty, is something a defendant
should be allowed to do only over the strenuous objections of his
attorney. We are not dealing here with a plea to a lesser bargained-for
offense or to an offense for which some sentence consideration is
possible. Under circumstances such as these, I can conceive of no
justification for defense counsel not insisting that the people be put to
their proofs . ." I26
Two years later, the Michigan courts were again confronted with
a defendant who pleaded guilty to the maximum sentence without
any advice from his attorney on the advisability of accepting or reject-
ing the plea. In People v. Coreeway,' 27 the defense attorney counseled
his client regarding the nature of the charges, the sentencing conse-
quences, possible defenses, the strength of the prosecution's case and
the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as opposed to a plea.
124 See id. at 690.
125 498 N.W.2d 430 (Mich. 1993).
126 /d. at 430 (Cavanagh, CJ,, dissenting).
127 538 N.W.2d 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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Counsel, however, "did not specifically recommend which course of
action the defendant should take." 128 The defendant pleaded guilty and
received the maximum sentence, life imprisonment without parole.
The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the trial court found that
"although counsel's representation was otherwise adequate, counsel's
'neutrality'—his failure to make a specific recommendation that de-
fendant either plead guilty or go to trial—constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel."' 23 The Court of Appeals ruled that "[w]hile an
attorney may elect to offer a client a specific recommendation whether
to go to trial or to plead guilty in the course of that consultation, we
decline to hold that such a recommendation is required or that the
failure to provide such a recommendation necessarily constitutes inef-
fective assistance of counsel,"' 34 and further, that "[a]bsent unusual
circumstances," 3 ' an informed and voluntary choice can be made
without a specific recommendation from counsel. Finding that the •
attorney's assistance enabled the defendant to make an informed and
voluntary choice, the court reinstated the defendant's conviction.'s 2
The preceding review of appellate decisions suggests that an at-
torney can sit by and watch a client make a seemingly illogical decision
such as pleading guilty without gaining any benefit, and yet still have
provided the effective assistance of counsel. When this understanding
is coupled with the courts' views regarding the lengths to which attor-
neys are permitted to go in trying to persuade their clients to accept
their advice regarding decisions, it becomes clear that there are few
limits on the attorney's role in counseling clients who decide to plead
guilty—it can be effective assistance to use all sorts of verbal and
psychological methods to persuade, as well as to choose to decline to
offer any opinion at all. Although there are few limitations on what
counsel is permitted to do in the course of counseling a client about
a plea offer, the remaining question is what, if anything, counsel is
required to do.
128 /d. at 62.
129 M.
13° Id.
131 Id.
132 The dissent took a more expansive view of the role of defense counsel and agreed with
the trial court that "the essence of an attorney's function ... is to give advice." Curteway, 538
N.W.2d at 65 (I-food, PJ., dissenting).
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B. Not Guilty Pleas
Less commonly, the defendant is convicted after trial and argues
that the decision to reject a plea and proceed to trial was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel. These claims arc rare. For one thing,
trials arc infrequent.'" Also, the claim of ineffectiveness by defendants
convicted after trial usually involves the attorney's preparation for or
performance at the trial.'" The focus here, though, is on the counsel-
ing. The claim is that if the attorney had provided effective assistance,
the defendant would have pleaded guilty.
The threshold issue is whether the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of effective assistance is even applicable in this context. In the case of
a plea, the concern is that the relinquishment of constitutional rights
(i.e., the right to a trial; the right to confront and cross-examine one's
accusers; and the right to remain silent) be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.' 35 Effective assistance of counsel is required to assist the
defendant in that endeavor.' 36 In the case of a defendant who com-
plains of ineffective assistance where he did not accept the plea, those
constitutional rights were not waived, but rather, were asserted.I 57
Courts have approached post-trial claims of ineffective assistance
at the plea negotiation stage somewhat warily. The opinions suggest
that it is one thing to join the many defendants who complain that
their lawyer insisted they plead guilty, and that had they not pleaded
guilty they would have prevailed at trial. It is quite another thing to
133 See, e.g., MALCOLM F. FEELEY, TIIE PROCESS IS TUE PLINISIIMENT—IIANI3LING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL. Cower 127 (1979); Thomas Haw!, Toward a Uniform Statutory Standard for
Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Right in Search of Definition After Strickland, 17 Loy. L.J. 203,
223 & n.144 (1986).
134 See supra notes 22-29.
133 When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives the constitutional right to a jury trial, the right
to confront his accusers and the privilege against sel•ncrimination. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). The courts must ensure that guilty pleas are voluntary, knowing and
intelligent. See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969).
1 " See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59.
157 See, e.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa 1986) ("There is a vast difference
between what happens to a defendant when he pleads guilty as opposed to what occurs when a
plea agreement is rejected. The rejection of a plea agreement, in most instances, will result in
the defendant going to trial with all of the concomitant constitutional safeguards that arc part
and parcel of our judicial process. The defendant who pleads guilty, on the other hand, waives
many of these protections . . .") (quoting Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900 (7th Cir.
1986)); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 350 A.2d 847, 850 ii.3 (Pa. 1976) (It is particularly significant
that counsel is not here accused of persuading appellant to waive any of his rights but rather
suggested that he avail himself of all the protection provided under our system of jurisprudence.
It would be in only the most unusual cases where such advice could be deemed a basis for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.").
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argue that their lawyer forced them to go to trial, and that any com-
petent lawyer would have insisted that they plead guilty. In United States
v. Faubion,'" the court noted that "[t]his argument, is unusual, to say
the least. Usually, a prisoner challenges an attorney's advice to plead
guilty. With excellent hindsight, prisoners often contend that, had they
gone to trial, they would have presented a stellar defense and, ulti-
mately, received an acquittal. The originality of Faubion's claim out-
paces its merit, however."'"
A related concern is that if claims of this nature are successful,
attorneys might become less likely to advise clients to assert their
constitutional rights to a trial. The court in Faubion stated directly,
"[w]c underscore our hesitancy to impose the badge of deficiency on
an attorney's measured judgment to go to trial instead of pleading
guilty. To hold otherwise would put attorneys on notice that their
zealous pursuit of an acquittal when the government offers no conces-
sions might result in a successful claim that he or she performed
deficiently." 140
The ambivalence toward these claims is also a product of the
difficulty in fashioning a remedy. If a court finds that a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel when she pleaded guilty, the
remedy is to give her the plea back so that she can assert her constitu-
tional rights and proceed to trial. On the other hand, assume that a
defendant who received ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining
stage subsequently received a fair trial. Surely, the remedy is not to
reverse the trial in order to hold another one. Two fair trials will not
undo the ineffective assistance that led to the defendant's rejecting a
plea prior to trial in the first place. The issue of the effectiveness, the
constitutionality, of the counseling takes on paramount importance.
1 M 19 E3d 226 (5th Cir. 1994).
105 1d. at 228-29; see also United States v. Holcomb, 943 F. Stipp. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 1996)
("111here is little case law on the consequences of a defendant's rejection of a plea offer in favor
of going to trial, with a subsequent attempt to recover the benefit of the unaccepted plea bargain.
Most claims of ineffective assistance by counsel of this type result from guilty pleas that leave
defendants dissatisfied with their sentences."); McClettithan v. Duggcr, 767 F. Supp. 257, 258
(M.D. Fla. 1991) ("While there is considerable case law addressing ineffective assistance of counsel
in conjunction with defendant's acceptance of a plea bargain, case law concerning this issue in
conjuucuott with defendant's rejection of a plea bargain is sparse."); Kraus, 397 N.W.2d at 673-74
(observing that cases of attorney misadvice during plea bargaining usually involve plea cases, and
that the court had not yet decided a case where the misadvice led to a not guilty plea); judge v.
State, 471 S.E.2d 146, 148 (S.C. 1996) (noting that the question of a defendant's Sixth Amend.
ment rights when he asserts that ineffective assistance resulted in the rejection of a plea had not
yet been resolved by the South Carolina Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of the United
States).
140 19 F.3d at 230.
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The question becomes whether the court can or should direct the
prosecution to reoffer the plea that was rejected, or whether there arc
other appropriate remedies available.
Some have argued that permitting defendants who are convicted
after trial to raise these claims gives defendants two bites at the apple.
In Kates v. United States, 111 the court noted the prosecution's position
that the defendant's argument was a "post-conviction effort to eat his
cake and have it, to grab the benefit of a deal which he had spurned,
having already put the government to the test of trial." 142 Similarly, in
State v. Kraus, 148 the court noted that "[i] t would be anomalous if an
accused were to enjoy an enviable advantage by virtue of the misadvice.
Upon receiving misleading advice an accused could, under the pro-
posed rule, proceed with the comforting knowledge there was no risk
in the trial; an acquittal would free the defendant and an unfavorable
verdict could be set aside." 141 In United Slates v. Busse,'` 5 the prosecution
argued that acceptance of defendant's claim would mean that any
defendant convicted after trial could argue that she was not properly
counseled about a plea. The court agreed that this was a legitimate
concern, but held that it should not result in a "blanket prohibition"
against all such claims.'"
Notwithstanding the issues noted above, the majority of courts
have concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel is applicable to the decision to reject a plea offer and
proceed to trial. The premise is that the "defendant has the right to
make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer." 47
The Supreme Court of California considered the issue at length and
determined that ineffective assistance resulting in rejection of a plea
is similar to the converse. "Roth alternate decisions—to plead guilty or
instead to proceed to trial—are products of the same attorney-client
interaction and involve the same professional obligations of counsel.
Application of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel to the advice given a defendant to plead guilty necessarily
encompasses the counterpart of that advice: to reject a proffered plea
141 930 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"2 1d. at 192.
143
 397 N.W.2d 671,674 (Iowa 1986),
144
	 at 674; see also Young v. State, 608 So, 2d 111,112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (a defendant
who pleads guilty due to misadvice gets a new,trial whereas a defendant who went to trial due to
inisadvice has 'nothing to lose").
"5 814 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
116 /d. at 765.
147 United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39,43 (3d Cir. 1992).
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bargain and submit the issue of guilt to the trier of fact."'" In Barentine
v. United States,'" a district court held that "[w] here defense counsel
has failed to inform a defendant of a plea offer, or where defense
counsel's incompetence results in a defendant's deciding to go to trial
rather than pleading guilty, the federal courts have been unanimous
in finding that such conduct constitutes a violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance . .
As the court concluded in United Slates v. Day, 15 ' "the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel guarantees more than the
Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial," 152
 and fair trials subsequent to
ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining stage do not cure the
underlying constitutional defect.'"
1. Failure to Inform of Offer
Often, the defendant is convicted after trial and then claims that
counsel was ineffective for failing to inform her of the prosecution's
plea offer. Pursuant to Strickland,'" the defendant must show that the
attorney's performance was unreasonable under prevailing profes-
sional standards,'" and that there was a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's errors, the result would have been different.'" Numerous
courts have held that the failure to inform the defendant of a plea
148 In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 925 (Cal. 1992); see also Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065,
1068 (7th Cir. 1991); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 E2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1981); Turner v.
Stale, 661 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (M.D. Tenit. 1987) ("To accept or to reject a plea offer presents
a binary choice at a fork in the road; providing constitutional protection against an incompetent
shove in one direction, but not against an equally incompetent shove in the other, may produce
unwanted skewing of the results.") ; Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991, 998 (hid. Ct. App. 1978); People
v. Carter, 520 N.W.2d 133, 134 11.1 (Levin, j., dissenting) (Mich. 1994).
142 728 F. Supp. 1241 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
150 1d. at 1251; see also Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[A]n
incompetently counseled decision to go to trial appears to fall within the range of protection
appropriately provided by the Sixth Ainencnent.");johnsart, 793 F.2d at 902; Caruso v. Zelinsky,
689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Jerome, 933 F. Supp. 989, 994 (D. Nev. 1996)
(incompetently counseled decision to plead not guilty and to proceed to trial does fall within the
range of protection of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance).
151 969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992).
152 Id. at 45.
155 See id. at 41; see also Beckham, 639 F.2d at 267. Interestingly, the issue of the appropriate
remedy remains. Most courts attempt to adjust the judgment and sentence in a manner consistent
with the offer, or order a new trial with a direction that plea bargaining begin anew. See, e.g.,
Alvernaz, 2 Cal, 4th at 926.
154 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
155 See id. at 687.
156 See id. at 694.
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offer amounts to ineffective assistance.' 57 Generally, if counsel does not
convey a plea offer to a client, it is a "gross deviation from accepted
professional standards."'" Obviously, the failure to convey an offer
does not go directly to the issue of the attorney's counseling obligations
on the decision whether to enter a plea. Rather, it establishes that
counsel must at a minimum inform the defendant of an offer.
2. Inaccurate Information
The issue again is the nature of the alleged deficiency. Did counsel
provide objectively incorrect advice about matters such as the sentenc-
ing parameters, the elements of the charge or the existence of possible
defenses? Was counsel's advice, although not inaccurate, impermissibly
inadequate? Or was counsel's advice more in the nature of a prediction
that ultimately proved to be wrong?
In United States v. Day,'" the defendant turned down an offer of
five years incarceration, went to trial, was convicted and sentenced to
twenty-two years. The defendant claimed that he rejected the offer
because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant
alleged that defense counsel provided substandard advice regarding
sentence exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") by
failing to explain the possibility of career offender status, and by
miscalculating the maximum possible sentence as eleven years. The
court held that "a defendant has the right to make a reasonably in-
formed decision whether to accept a plea offer,"'" and that "the advice
that he received was so incorrect and so insufficient that it undermined
his ability to make an intelligent decision about whether to accept the
offer." 16 ' The court addressed the difficulty of delineating the constitu-
tional counseling obligations regarding the decision whether to accept
a plea offer: "We cannot state precisely what standard defense counsel
must meet when advising their clients about the desirability of a plea
bargain and, concomitantly, about sentence exposure." 11 i2 The court
157 See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 752 (1st Cir. 1991); Johnson, 793 F2d at 902; Caruso, 689 F.2d at 438;
Beckham, 639 F.2d at 266; United States v. Barber, 808 K Supp. 361, 378 (D.NJ. 1992); Barentine,
728 F. Supp. at 1243; LlOyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988); Lyles, 382 N.E.2d at 993; State v.
James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (may constitute ineffective assistance).
159 Caruso, 689 F.2d at 438.	 '
1 "969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992).
160 1d. at 43.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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observed, however, that while a "detailed exegesis"'" of the Guidelines
was not necessary for compliance with the Sixth Amendment, famili-
arity with their structure and basic content was necessary for effective
assistance.
The Fifth Circuit applied a similar analysis in Beckham v. Wain-
wright. 164 In Beckham, the defendant had withdrawn a negotiated plea
of five years after counsel told him that the five-year sentence remained
in effect even if convicted after trial. The defendant was convicted after
trial and sentenced to fifty years. The court distinguished counsel's
actions from tactical decisions and found that the conduct fell outside
the "range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 165
The district courts and state courts have also concluded that where
defense counsel provides incorrect information that leads a defendant
to go to trial rather than plead guilty, the defendant has established a
Sixth Amendment violation. 166
More difficult to decide are those cases where the alleged ineffec-
tiveness is not the provision of erroneous information, but a failure to
furnish sufficient information for the defendant to make a reasoned
decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial. In Kates v. United
States, 167 the defendant was offered five to forty years with a possible
downward departure from the five-year minimum. The defendant re-
jected the offer and was convicted after trial and sentenced to thirty
years. The defendant alleged that none of his attorneys advised him
that he faced thirty years if convicted after trial. All three of his attor-
neys testified, and although they each claimed to have told him things
like, "if he lost he was going to go to jail for a long time," 68 none of
them discussed the Guidelines fully or told him he faced thirty years.
The court held that the "failure to inform Mr. Kates about his actual
sentence exposure was unreasonable. Absent that vital, bottom-line
to Id.
164 539 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1981).
165 Id. at 267 (citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771)).
166 For cases that address inaccurate information regarding sentencing, sec, e.g., In re Myer-
nu, 831 F. Supp. 790, 793, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (turned down five years, went to trial and received
an indeterminate life sentence); McClenithan, 767 F. Supp. at 258-59 (offered fifteen years with
a minimum of five, went to trial and got thirty with a minimum of fifteen); Barentine, 728 F. Supp.
at 1244) (turned down offer of five years, went to trial, was convicted and sentenced to thirty-five
years). For examples of cases that discuss erroneous advice in other contexts, see, e.g., Kraus,
397 N.W.2d at 672 (titisadvice as to whether the prosecution had to prove specific intent); Carttr,
520 N.W.2d at 134 (Levin, J., dissenting) (misinformation as to whether the defendant could be
convicted as an aider and abettor).
161 930 F. Supp. 189 (D. Pa. 1996).
168 /d, at 191.
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information, he could not make an intelligent decision . . ."' 69 Since
defense counsel insufficiently advised the defendant about the pica
offer so that the defendant could not make a reasoned, intelligent
decision, counsel was ineffective. Similarly, in United States v. Busse, 17°
defense counsel advised the defendant that probation was the "likely
worst scenario" if the defendant was convicted after trial.' 7 ' The defen-
dant went to trial, was convicted, and was sentenced to five months in
jail. The court found that counsel, who was inexperienced with the
Guidelines, failed to discuss their application and ramifications fully
and, as a result, performed deficiently 172
In the final scenario, counsel provides advice in the form of an
opinion that turns out to be incorrect. In these cases, the attorney did
not provide inaccurate information (for example, the wrong sentenc-
ing structure), or insufficient data. Rather, counsel offered an opinion,
the defendant relied on it and it turned out to be wrong. The general
rule was noted in In re Alvernaz:'" "flAff e caution that a defense attor-
ney's simple misjudgment as to the strength of the prosecution's case,
the chances of acquittal, or the sentence a defendant is likely to receive
upon conviction, will not, without more, give rise to a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel." 174 In order for counsel's erroneous predic-
tion to amount to ineffective assistance, it must fall clearly below an
objective standard of reasonableness.' 75
3. Coercion
Just as there are numerous cases involving claims that attorneys
coerced or pressured their clients into pleading guilty, one might
expect many cases where the allegation is that the attorney insisted,
urged or pushed the client to reject a plea offer, or more affirmatively,
to insist on a trial.' 76
 Instead, the cases have tended to focus on the
reasonableness of the advice rather than the possible coercive aspects
lf") Id. at 192.
170 814 F. Stipp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
171 Id. at 761,
172 See id. at 764; see also Williams v, State, 605 A.2d 103, 109 (Md. 1992).
175 2 Cal. 4th 924 (Cal. 1992).
174 1d. at 937.
175 See, e.g.,Judge, 471 S,E.2d at 150 (observing that advice to reject a plea is not unreasonable
simply because, in hindsight, the advice was wrong or the tactics backfired, and that tactical or
strategic choices will amount to ineffective assistance only if they arc so patently unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have so chosen),
176
 Although it is one thing to urge the client to reject a plea bargain, and quite another to
urge the client to go to trial, the result is the same—if the advice is followed, the case will proceed
to trial.
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of it. Under what circumstances will counsel's advice to reject a plea
offer in favor of a trial amount to ineffective assistance of counsel? In
Turner v. Stale,'" the defendant declined an offer of two years incar-
ceration, was convicted after trial, and received a life sentence. Prior
to trial, one of his co-defendants pleaded guilty for a two-year sentence.
The other co-defendant went to trial. At that trial, an eyewitness and
the co-defendant who had previously pleaded guilty testified against
him. He was convicted and sentenced to seventy years in prison.
Turner's local counsel "recommended strongly" that he accept the
plea and advised that a decision to go to trial was "ludicrous."'" Co-
counsel also believed that Turner would "be crazy not to take" the
offer.'" Even the prosecutor testified that the offer "obviously . . . was
a great offer and should have been accepted."'" Nevertheless, Turner's
lead counsel advised him against accepting the offer. Counsel testified
that he was "optimistic" about the outcome of the trial, and did not
recommend that the defendant plead guilty.' 81 The trial court deter-
mined that any competent attorney would have recommended accep-
tance of the offer, and stated that counsel was overly optimistic about
the outcome, imparted this unrealistic feeling to his client, and greatly
understated the risks involved in taking the case to trial.' 82 On appeal,
the prosecution conceded ineffective performance, but argued that
there was no showing of prejudice. The court reversed the conviction,
finding that the defendant had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel.
Turner is an anomaly. As a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted recently, "[114]y research reveals only one case (Turner) in
which a federal court granted a writ of habeas corpus based solely on
a claim that trial counsel's advice to reject a plea offer and to proceed
to trial was ineffective."'"
177
 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988).
178 Turner, 664 F, Supp. at 1121.
17° Id.
180 Id. (ellipses in original).
181 Id. at 1115 n.6.
182 1d. at 1117 n.11. At the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, there was
evidence that counsel had "an inflated estimate of his own abilities, an unrealistic estimate of the
probabilities of outcome at trial, and a casual attitude toward trial preparation." Id. at 1115 n.6.
There was also testitnony that he had indulged in cocaine and patronised prostitutes during the
weekend prior to trial. See id.
185
 Commonwealth v. Boyd, 688 A.2d 1172,1177 (Pa. 1997) (Camille, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Faubion, 19 F.3d at 228-29; Rodriguez, 929 F.2d at 752-53
(counsel's advice to go to trial was tactical matter and tactical errors, even egregious ones, do not
provide basis for postconviction relief).
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A case in point is United States v. Rodriguez.' 84
 The defendant was
offered twenty years in prison. He claimed that his attorney "insisted"
he go to trial, thereby causing him to expose himself to a potential
term of seventy-five years, and that counsel "misled" him into rejecting
the offer by misstating and minimizing the prosecution's evidence and
failing to explain the potential consequences of trial. 185 The defendant
went to trial, was convicted, and received a sentence of fifty-four years.
The court ruled that counsel was not ineffective, and observed that
claims of ineffectiveness based on counsel's recommending that a
defendant go to trial rather than plead guilty are merely attacks on
counsel's tactics: "[E]rrors, even egregious ones, in this respect do not
provide a basis for postconviction relief. Thus, while [defendant's]
allegations of specific misconduct, [by counsel]—such as not inform-
ing [defendant] of a plea offer . . . may require an evidentiary hearing,
the mere allegation that [counsel] wrongly recommended to go to trial
was properly dismissed."'"'' Significantly, the court expressed little con-
cern about whether counsel pushed the defendant to reject the plea
by overstating the prospects at trial, or whether the advice to go to trial
was reasonable.
The state courts have reached similar results.' 87 In People v. for-
dan, 188 the defense attorney counseled the defendant to reject an offer
of twenty years in prison. The defendant was convicted and sentenced
to sixty years incarceration with the possibility of an additional fourteen
years. The court distinguished Turner on the ground that the case
against the defendant was not so overwhelming, and held that the
advice to reject the offer was not ineffective. In Judge v. State,'" the
defendant was offered a sentence with a seven-year maximum. On the
advice of counsel, he rejected the plea bargain in favor of a trial. 1 " He
was convicted after trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
' 84 929 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1991)
' 85 1d. at 748.
'561d. at 753 .
187 One exception is Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261,262 (Nev. 1988). In Larson, defense counsel
advised his client to go to trial because he thought a trial would receive national attention. Not
surprisingly, the court found his conduct to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The court contrasted counsel's actions with those where an attorney makes reasoned plea
recommendations which in hindsight prove Unwise, or relies on ultimately unsuccessful tactics,
188 540 N.E.2d 941 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
1 °471 S.E.2d 146 (S.C. 1996).
' 90
 Testimony at the postconviction hearing revealed the following counseling between attor-
ney and client: "[Lawyer] told Mr. Judge what the offer was [voluntary manslaughter with a
seven-year cap I. At that point Mr. Judge basically asked [lawyer], 'What should I do? What do
you think I should do?' [Lawyer] basically said, 'Well, I would reject it. I think we ought to reject
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central issue was not the reasonableness of the advice to reject the plea
offer per se, but rather that the advice was given prior to defense
counsel's having received various discovery items. Finding that counsel
could not have known about these items when the advice was given,
the court found that the' attorney's performance was not deficient.
Two cases from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlight the
difficulty facing defendants raising these claims. In Commonwealth v.
Thomas,m the defendant turned down six to twelve years and received
a life sentence after trial. The court, reflecting an uneasiness with
post-trial allegations of ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining
stage, observed initially that counsel was accused not of persuading his
client to waive rights by pleading guilty, but rather of advising his client
to avail himself of his constitutional rights. Determining that it was not
an ironclad case for the prosecution, the court found no Sixth Amend-
ment violation, and noted that only in the most unusual cases could
advice to go to trial be ineffective.'" Two decades later, the court
decided Commonwealth v. Boyd. 193 After trial, the defendant was sen-
tenced to four to eight years. He had been offered six months to one
year and his attorney advised him to reject it. The court held that, in
order to establish that the attorney was ineffective, the defendant must
show that there was "no reasonable basis for [counsel's] advice."'"
Counsel testified that the defendant was interested in the plea offer,
but that he "discouraged him from taking it."'" Counsel testified fur-
ther that he felt no jury would convict because the complainant was a
poor witness who had given inconsistent testimony and had admitted
to perjury. Satisfied that counsel provided a reasonable basis for his
advice, the court found that he was not ineffective for advising the
defendant to reject the plea offer.
It is thus apparent that a defense attorney's recommendation that
a client reject a plea offer and opt for a trial will rarely amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland requires that judicial scru-
tiny of counsel's performance should begin with a "strong presump-
tion" that the conduct fell within "the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance." 196 Deference is particularly due to decisions of
it and go to trial.' At that point Mr. Judge said something to the effect, 'Whatever you say . • .
that is what I will do.' We then went to the trial."Judge, 471 S.E.2d at 151 n.2.
191 350 A.2d 847 (Pa. 1976).
192 See id. at 850 11.3.
193 688 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1997).
191 Id. at 1175.
195 Id.
196 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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strategy and tactics. 197 It follows then that "advice by counsel to reject
a plea offer will constitute ineffective assistance only when the advice
was 'so patently unreasonable' that no competent attorney would have
so advised her client."' 98
4. Neutrality
Given that an attorney must convey a plea offer to the client, must
provide accurate and adequate information and is permitted to urge
certain decisions and offer estimations and opinions about likely out
comes, the question becomes what happens when defense counsel
chooses to stand mute or remain neutral as to the plea decision, and
the defendant opts for trial, is convicted and is sentenced to a much
higher term than the government originally offered. Defense lawyers
attempt to justify a neutral approach to counseling on several grounds,
including adherence to principles of client-centered counseling,I 9" and
responsiveness to studies documenting defendants' complaints that
their attorneys simply told them what to do rather than provided advice
and counsel."""
In United Stales v. Holcomb,"' the defendant was offered a plea with
a sentence in the range of twelve 'months. Counsel testified that he did
not specifically advise the defendant whether to accept or reject the
plea, as he believed the decision was for the defendant to make.202 The
defendant went to trial, was convicted and was sentenced to forty-six
months imprisonment. The court hardly discussed defense counsel's
neutrality, focusing instead on his advice regarding the possible sen-
tence after trial. Finding that counsel properly informed the defendant
197 See id. at 689-90. In United Slates v. Rodriguez, the court ruled that advice to go to trial
was tactical in nature, and that tactical errors, even if "egregious," should not sustain an ineffective
assistance claim. 929 F.2d at 753.
198jerome, 933 F. Supp. at 994 (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir.
1983)); see also Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1355 (5th Cir. 1981); fudge, 471 S.E.2d at
150. The "patently unreasonable" standard ensures that lawyers who recommend that a client
reject a plea in favor of a trial will rarely be found to be ineffective. As a result, attorneys who
previously were disinclined to make such a recommendation for fear of appellate scrutiny should
be more likely to advise a client to go to trial, and attorneys who enjoy trials and often urge clients
to turn down plea offers will no doubt feel fortified.
L99 See discussion of client-centered counseling infra text accompanying notes 219-49.
200 See, e.g., JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE—THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPEC-
TIVE (1972); Alan F. Arcuri, Lawyers, Judges, and Plea Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates'
Views, 4 j. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 177 (1976); Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their
Clients See Them, 1 AM. J. Calm. L. 141 (1972). For a discussion of other justifications for neutrality,
sec infra notes 397-404 and accompanying text.
291 94 3 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1996).
202 See id. at 15,
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about his potential sentence, the court held that the attorney's per-
formance was not deficient. In United States v. Jerome, 2"3
 the defendant
was offered a sentence with a maximum of twenty years. Counsel
testified that he "did not recommend to Mr. Jerome that he accept or
reject the government's plea offer," and that he told the defendant
"that the decision was up to him. "204
 After trial, the defendant received
a sentence of thirty-five years. The defendant appealed, claiming that
"no competent attorney would, in the face of such overwhelming
evidence of Jerome's guilt, have failed to urge acceptance of the of
 In order to frame the issue, the court noted significantly that
counsel never advised the defendant to reject the plea. Rather, counsel
took no position as to whether the defendant should accept or reject
the prosecution's offer. In other words, perhaps the assistance might
have been ineffective, or at least the court would have had to examine
the reasonableness of the advice, had counsel advised the defendant
to reject the plea; instead, counsel remained neutral. The court ruled
that it was not aware of any authority for the proposition that the
failure to recommend acceptance of an offer can amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel, and denied the defendant's motion to vacate his
conviction.
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue directly in Jones v. Mur-
ray. 206
 On the morning of the first day of trial, the prosecution offered
the defendant a plea with a sentence of, essentially, two consecutive
life terms. Counsel reviewed with his client the evidence against him
and the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case. He in-
formed Jones that there was a seventy percent chance of conviction
and a forty to fifty percent chance of receiving the death penalty. He
also told his client that he would likely receive eventual parole if he
pleaded guilty. Counsel left the decision whether to accept the plea
offer to the defendant, and offered no recommendation as to the
wisdom of pleading guilty. The defendant rejected the offer on the
ground that he was innocent. He was convicted at trial and sentenced
to death.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for
failing to recommend that he accept the plea bargain and for not
attempting to persuade him to do so. Analyzing counsel's conduct
pursuant to the dictates of Strickland, the court held that "Nde cannot
20 933 F. Supp. 989 (D. Nov. 1996).
204 Id, at 995.
"Id. at 994.
206 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991).
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conclude that counsel's decision, at this point and in the context of
his client's rejection of the plea offer for the stated reason that he was
innocent, to refrain from a vigorous attempt to change his client's
mind was 'outside the wide range of professionally competent assis-
tatice.'"207 By sanctioning lawyer neutrality even in a death penalty case,
the court sent a clear message about the role of counsel in criminal
cases.
A requirement of non-neutrality is not, however, without support.
In Commonwealth v. Napper, 208 the offer was twelve months to three
years. Counsel informed his client of the terms of the offer but did not
give any advice or recommendation on the advisability of accepting it.
The defendant stated that he would not accept any plea that included
"state time" (more than two years). The defendant went to trial, was
convicted, and received a sentence of ten to forty years. At a postcon-
viction hearing, counsel testified that the case was a "stone cold loser,"
but that since he was interested in having his first jury trial, he "off-
handedly" told his client about the offer. 2"9 The court ruled that de-
fense counsel has a duty to infOrm a client of the merits of a plea
bargain and to provide advice as to whether the defendant should
accept the offer.") As a result, even though counsel did not provide
any inaccurate information, and notwithstanding that the defendant
had told counsel that he would not accept any offer that involved "state
Lime," the court held that trial counsel was ineffective.
In Stale v. Brisio1, 2 " the court considered whether counsel had an
obligation to go beyond neutrality, in fact beyond merely offering an
opinion, and to try to persuade a client to accept the advice. The
defendant was offered a plea to a reduced charge with an indefinite
sentence from zero to ten years. Counsel informed the defendant of
the offer and sent him a letter detailing the terms of the plea. Counsel
recommended that the defendant "carefully consider" the offer, but
when the client stated his opposition, counsel never urged him to
reconsider or initiated further discussions about a plea. 212 The defen-
207 Id. at 1111 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
2"8 385 A.2(1 521 (Pa. 1978).
20" Id. at 523. Counsel testified that "had this case been presented to toe two months after it
was presented I would not have walked into Mr, Napper and offhandedly told hint the plea. I
would have walked into Mr. Napper I would have walked in and told Mr. Napper that it was
to his best interest to plea, and Mr. Napper, I would assume, would have pled," Id. at 523-24.
2 L (' See id. at 524.
2t1
	 A.2d 1290 (Vt. 1992).
212 See id. at 1291.
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dant was convicted at trial and sentenced to twenty-five years to life
incarceration.
At a postconviction hearing, the Rutland Superior Court held that
the defendant was entitled to "more advice than a mere recommenda-
tion to 'seriously consider' the State's offer," and that counsel had per-
formed ineffectively.2 's The Vermont Supreme Court analyzed whether
counsel's performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness
as informed by prevailing professional norms. 2 " The court charac-
terized the alleged error not as counsel's failure to convey an offer, but
as a failure to "aggressively pursue" the offer with his client after his
client had rejected 4. 2 ' 5 The court noted that it was ineffective assis-
tance if an offer was conveyed in an inadequate manner such as by
advising a client not to take a clearly favorable offer, 216 or by providing
inaccurate information:217
 However, the court found no authority for
the proposition that an attorney who fails to persuade a client to accept
a plea violates the standard of reasonable competence. As a result, the
court held that counsel's conduct did not fall below prevailing stand-
ards of reasonable competence.
II. CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
The concept of client-centered lawyering grew out of concerns
about the attorney-client relationship and the allocation of decision-
making authority. The so-called traditional view of lawyering assumed
that clients should be passive and delegate decisionmaking responsi-
bilities to their attorneys. 218 Counseling consisted of the lawyer spelling
out the pertinent legal considerations, specifying what the attorney
believed was the right decision and urging the client to accept that
recommendation . 2 ' 9
Client-centered counseling, on the other hand, requires that at-
torneys listen to their clients and ensure that clients assume an active
and primary role in making decisions about their cases. 22° The emer-
gence of models of client-centered lawyering is related to the growth
215 Id.
214 See id. at 1291-92; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
215 See Bristol, 618 A.2d at 1292.
216 See, e.g., Turner, 858 F.2d at 1205-07.
217 See, e.g., Kraus, 397 N.W.2d at 673.
218 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 506; Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited:
Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 B.Y.U. L REV. 307 ("As with most
professional-client relations, it was simply assumed that the power to make significant decisions
was delegated to the professional.").
215 See Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 504.
225 See, e.g., Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1731,1742 (1993).
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of clinical legal education in the 1960s and 1970s. 221 Clinical legal
education was in many ways a response to the needs of poor people
for legal assistance.'" A majority of clinical faculty came from legal
services or public defender offices and were well-versed in the prob-
lems inherent in the attorney-client relationship. 223 Early on, clinicians
criticized public interest lawyers for forcing decisions upon their cli-
ents, and emphasized the need to promote increased client participa-
tion in the resolution of their cases. 224 Constructs of client-centered
lawycring grew out of this backdrop.
The most widely utilized paradigm of client-centered lawycring is
that proposed by Professors David Binder, Paul Bergman and Susan
Price. 225 In Legal Interviewing and Counseling, 226 Binder and Price sug-
gest a counseling method created to promote client decisionniaking,
and exhort attorneys to ensure that clients arc enabled to make their
own decisions. 227 To avoid unduly influencing the client, the attorney
should "communicate neutrality"228 and not offer advice or opinions,
even if the client asks directly. 2" Scholars have posited a variety of
justifications in support of the paramount importance of client deci-
sionmaking. Chief among them is the argument that client decision-
221 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 518 rile origins of client-centered lawycring arc
inextricably bound up with the development of 'modern' clinical legal education itself."). For a
discussion of the history of clinical legal education, see George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal
Education: History and Diagnosis, 261 Lt:ont. Ermc. 162 (1974).
222 See, e.g., David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. Sc,,.
L, REv. 87 (1990) (observing that one of the themes of clinical education was the provision of
legal services to disadvantaged groups).
223
	 id.
224 See, e.g., Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA
I3RIEECASE 106 (Aug. 1977); Robert 13, Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv.
697, 707 (1992) ("tCllient-centeredness has been one of the key concepts in clinical education.").
225 Anthony V. Ailed, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. Scii. L. REV. 7, 15 21.49
(1990) ("In 1989 and 1990, the West Publishing Co. estimated adoption of Binder and Price's
Legal Interviewing and Counseling by over 100 law schools and colleges in the United States.").
Clinical law teachers, in particular, rely on the Binder & Price text. See Dinerstein, supra note 42,
at 504; Dinerstein, supra note 224, at 700 (Binder & PriCC'S LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH had a tremendous influence on clinical law teachers and
their students).
221 i BINDER & PRICE, supra note 42.
227 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 507; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 717, 720 (1987) ("Broadly we can say that client-centered practice takes the principle of
client decisionmaking seriously, and derives from this premise the prescription that a central
responsibility of the lawyer is to enable the client to exercise his right to choose,"). Binder &
Price, however, do recognize that in limited circumstances there may be exceptions to client-cen-
tered decisionmaking. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 42, at 153-55, 192-210.
228 See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 42, at 166.
229 1n certain carefully circumscribed situations, counsel may accede to the client's request
and provide an opinion. Id. at 186-87, 197-200.
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making reinforces the laudable ideal of individual autonomy.2" Some
have argued that doctrines of informed consent applicable to the
doctor-patient relationship should be adapted for use in the legal
arena.231 Just as a doctor cannot control a patient's treatment without
the patient's consent, attorneys should have to involve clients un-
equivocally in the decisionmaking process."2 Although Binder and
Price seem to suggest that standards of professional ethics also support
their conceptions of client-centered decisionmaking, 2" others have
argued that both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are equivocal as to the proper
allocation of decisionmaking authority. 234
The Binder and Price model has not been free from criticism. In
particular, many have argued that the requirements of neutrality and
the concomitant withholding of the attorney's opinions are undesir-
able and nearly impossible. 235 In 1991, Binder and Price, along with
Paul Bergman, revamped their analysis of the propriety of lawyers
giving advice." 6 Binder, Bergman and Price still trumpet the need for
lawyer neutrality as a central feature of client-centered counseling; 237
they extol explicitly the value of autonomy. 2" They now write, however,
that considerations of autonomy dictate that in some situations, the
attorney may provide an opinion. 239 If the lawyer has counseled a client
2" See Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 512; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-
Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 340 (1987) ("(Altitonorny
establishes a presumption in favor of client decisiontnaking over all aspects of the lawsuit.").
231 See, e.g., BINDER & PRICE, supra note 42, at 160 n.2; Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979); Strauss,
supra note 230.
232 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 530.
233 BINDER & PRICE, .supra note 42, at 147-48.
234 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 534-38; Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking
Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAV/S L. REv. 1049, 1052-56
(1984); Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making
and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 Ass. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1003,
1004 (observing that the Model Code "is at best ambiguous in resolving this question of allocation
of authority."); Strauss, supra note 230, at 319-20.
235 See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 227, at 752-53 ("M he process of client-centered counseling
affects, and in important respects manipulates its clients, both by denying them ready access to
advice they might desire, and by engaging them in a decisionmaking process with the potential
to shape their thinking subtly but profoundly.").
238 DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991).
227 1d. at 288 (lawyer should "strive to maintain an appearance of impartiality throughout the
counseling process."). The authors do, however, recognize that some scholars believe that main-
taining an appearance of neutrality may be impossible. See id. at 288 n.3.
238 Id. at 23, 261 ("ICJ lient autonomy is of paramount importance.").
252 See id. at 279-80, 347-50. The authors now reject their own "radical" view which required
attorneys to reject requests for advice in order to avoid unduly influencing the client's decisions.
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thoroughly so that the lawyer can base her opinion on the client's
subjective values, then she may provide an opinion to a client who
requests it. 21° Reflecting their newfound willingness to permit lawyer
involvement in decisionmaking, the authors now also allow lawyers, in
limited circumstances, to offer unsolicited opinions. When a client is
unable to make a decision, whether due to the client's personality or
the difficulty of the problem, a lawyer may offer an opinion in order
to break a "decisional logjam." 241 Furthermore, Binder, Bergman and
Price now authorize lawyers to intervene in their clients' decisions
when they believe the decision is erroneous because the client has
misjudged the likely outcome, or when they believe the decision is
morally wrong. 212 By permitting lawyers to give opinions and intervene
in certain situations, the authors appear to have responded to some of
their critics. In relaxing the prohibitions against lawyer involvement in
the decisionmaking process, however, they subject themselves to the
criticisms leveled against the traditional lawyer-client relationship that
led to the development of client-centered counseling in the first
p lacc. 243
It is noteworthy that Binder, Bergman and Price have attempted
to move beyond the public interest or poverty law arena. Although
client-centered counseling was in many ways an outgrowth of the ex-
periences of lawyers in legal services settings, 244 Binder, Bergman and
Price consciously provide examples of legal problems in a variety of
litigation contexts, and discuss numerous issues that arise when coun-
seling private parties in business transactions. 245 This Article, however,
They now believe that the "radical" view of client•centered counseling "demeans clients' ability
to make independent judgments; deprives clients of the opportunity to get advice from a person
who has professional expertise and emotional distance from a problem; and may well defeat the
expectations of most clients." Id. at 279.
245 1n fact, if pressed by the client, the lawyer may even provide an opinion based on personal
values. See id. at 280 11.49.
241 See BINDER, supra note 236, at 353-54.
242 See id. at 281-84,356-59.
243 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 224, at 710-11 (arguing that "die authors may have lost
sight of their original insight that opinions may tend to silence and dominate vulnerable clients,"
and that by "removing the strong constraints against lawyers expressing their opinions, the
authors provide lawyers bent on providing those opinions ample support for doing so."). The
Binder, Bergman 8c Price model of client•eentered counseling has been criticized on other
grounds as well. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 225; Dinerstein, supra note 224, at 719-28 (discussing
the failure of Binder, Bergman & Price to address contextual concerns such as the nature of the
lawyer-client relationship with respect to the role of race, class and gender; the importance of
client stories; and problems of professional responsibility); Ellmann, supra note 227, at 753-78;
Shalleck, supra note 220, at 1743-48.
294
	 supra notes 221-24.
245 See Dinerstein, supra note 224, at 699.
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is concerned with counseling defendants in criminal cases, specifically
indigent clients246
 and clients with constitutional rights, both to counsel
and to the effective assistance of that counsel."' In-house, or live-client,
law school clinics are, similarly, primarily involved with poor clients. 2"
This Article analyzes the applicability of the Binder, Bergman, and
Price model in that context.
Robert Dinerstein's essay discussing an experience of his while
supervising students in a law school criminal clinic, although not
intended as an example of client-centered counseling in practice,
raises difficult and important questions regarding the counseling re-
sponsibilities of lawyers in criminal cases. 249
 The criminal justice clinic
received the case after the defendant had been convicted at a bench
trial. Local procedures permitted a trial de novo, and the case was
scheduled for a jury trial in less than four weeks. The defendant was
charged with two counts of battery. At the initial interview, the client's
factual recitation was similar to that told by the prosecution at the first
trial, but she disputed her motivations for her acts. She claimed that
the complainant had waved at her with an outstretched palm, a sign
of disrespect in her culture. As a result, she swung a tennis racket at
the complainant.
The defendant informed her student attorneys that she was un-
happy with her first lawyer because he had "strongly urged" her to
accept a negotiated disposition, 25° and she insisted that she wanted to
go to trial in order to "tell her story." 151
 The students counseled the
client thoroughly about her options, predicted the legal consequences
of each choice and left the decision to the client. They informed her
that based on their research, the likely result of a trial was a conviction.
The student attorneys did not offer an opinion about the desirability
of accepting or rejecting a plea offer, and did not in any way attempt
consciously to influence their client's choice. The defendant opted for
a trial.
246 See supra note 18.
247 See supra notes 13-16.
249
 I3y "in-house" clinic, I refer to a clinic in which students, under faculty supervision,
represent clients. For descriptions Of these types of clinics, see, e.g., J. Michael Norwood, Requiring
a Live Client, In-I louse Clinical Course: A Report on the University of New Mexico Law School
Experience, 19 N.M. L. REV. 265 (1989).
249 See Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971
(1992).
2" Id. at 973.
291 Id. at 972.
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On the eve of trial, Dinerstein met with the student attorneys and
emphasized the importance of telling the client that if she told the
story that she had told them, their judgment was that there would be
a conviction. Dinerstein observed that although he believed that such
counseling was required by a client-centered approach, he worried
whether it was a "subtle attempt" to convince the client to change her
mind. Apparently, the possibility of advising the defendant as to the
desirability of a plea offer (that is, whether in Dinerstein and the
students' opinion it was the best. choice) was not considered. The next
day, the students spoke with their client and she still wanted a trial.
As Dinerstein notes, the trial was in many ways the least important
part of the story. 252 In short, during deliberations the defendant and
the students had a "heated discussion." She felt that her case had not
been presented forcefully enough. The jury returned a verdict convict-
ing her of one of two counts. As the judge began to address the
students, their client grew increasingly agitated, yelling and interrupt-
ing the judge. The judge ordered the sheriffs to Lake her to a local
emergency room for psychiatric evaluation.
William Simon also detailed his counseling experience repre-
senting a client in a criminal case. 253 Although it was the only criminal
case he ever handled and was not part of a law school clinic, it delib-
erately raises issues involving the counseling obligations of attorneys in
criminal cases. The defendant, Mrs. Jones, was charged with leaving
the scene of a traffic accident. She was black and the other driver was
white. Mrs. Jones informed Simon that she had in fact stopped, but
that it was the other driver who fled the scene. The police, without
conducting any independent investigation, accepted the other driver's
version and arrested Mrs. Jones. The prosecutor offered, in effect, a
plea of nolo contendere which amounted basically to six months pro-
bation. Simon spoke to his client for about Len minutes. For about half
the time, they argued over whether he would tell her what he thought
she should do. She told him, "You're the expert. That's what we come
to lawyers for."254 Simon insisted that because the decision was hers, he
could not tell her what to do. fle then spelled out the advantages and
disadvantages and ended by saying, "If you took their offer, there
probably wouldn't be any bad practical consequences, but it wouldn't
be total justice."255 Mrs. Jones and her minister, attending as a friend
252 /d. at 977.
253 See William II. Simon, Lawyer . Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Mn. L,
Ray. 213 (1991).
251 Id. at 215.
255 Id.
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and character witness, responded, "We want justice." 256 Simon then
spoke with co-counsel, a friend and lawyer with experience in traffic
cases. Co-counsel next spoke with Mrs. Jones. He, too, did not tell her
directly what he thought she should do, but went over the same con-
siderations as did Simon. He, however, discussed the disadvantages last,
described the possibility of jail in slightly more detail, and said nothing
about 'justice." Mrs. Jones decided to accept the plea offer.
In neither case did counsel offer an opinion about the desirability
of accepting or rejecting the plea offer. In Dinerstein's case, the client
never asked for the attorney's opinion. In Simon's case, the client
asked expressly, and apparently repeatedly, for the lawyer's advice. In
both cases, the attorneys spelled out the advantages and disadvantages.
In Dinerstein's case, the student attorneys made a deliberate attempt
at. neutrality. In Simon's case, co-counsel made an apparently deliber-
ate attempt to influence the client's decision.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BORIA V. KEANE
In May 1988, in upstate New York, Oscar Boria was arrested inside
the garage at 0.B.'s Towing, his place of business, during a "buy and
bust" narcotics operation conducted by state police.257 The arresting
officers searched him and recovered $2,000.00 in marked money from
his shirt. 258 Mr. Boria was indicted on one count of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the second degree, 259 a Class A-II felony, 260 for
selling two ounces of cocaine to a police informant. Although he
had no criminal record, he faced a minimum sentence of three years
to life imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of eight years and four
months to life. 26 '
Several weeks later, the District Attorney notified defense counsel
that the prosecution would accept a plea of guilty to the reduced
charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, 262
a Class B felony, with the minimum legally permissible sentence of one
2561d. at 216.
257 Soria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 1996).
256 The police had given an informant that money to use in making a narcotics purchase.
259 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.41(1) (McKinney 1997) thereinafter PL.] defines criminal sale of
a controlled substance in the second degree as knowingly and unlawfully selling one-half ounce
or more of a narcotic drug.
266 P.L. § 220.41.
291 	§ 70.00(2), (3).
262 P.L. § 220.39(1) defines criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree as
knowingly and unlawfully selling a narcotic drug.
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to three years incarceration. 2" The District Attorney warned that if the
offer was rejected, a superseding indictment for a Class A-I felony 261
would be filed, making that plea offer no longer legally possible. 265
Defense counsel spent much of the next two weeks speaking with
Mr. Boria. He told him that there was an offer of a B felony with a one
to three year sentence, and that if it was rejected there would be a
superseding indictment carrying a minimum sentence of fifteen years
to life. They discussed the facts of the case, the search and seizure issues
and the likelihood of prevailing at trial. Defense counsel explained to
his client that in his view, drug cases were extremely difficult to defend
in upstate New York because of the strong, pervasive anti-drug attitudes
of the jurors. Counsel, however, did not advise his client whether to
accept or reject the plea. 2 '"'
On each occasion when they discussed the case and the offer
made by the prosecution, Mr. Boria informed defense counsel that he
was absolutely innocent and would not accept any plea, especially one
that required him to serve time in jail. Defense counsel advised the
prosecutor that the plea offer was rejected. Shortly thereafter, a super-
seding indictment charging an A-I felony was filed. The defendant
went to trial, was convicted and was sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment with a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life.
In 1996, the Second Circuit granted the defendant's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus,217 holding that the defendant did not receive
263 Under New York State's statutory scheme, this was the lowest permissible charge reduction
and sentence for an adult accused of a Class A-II felony. See N.Y. CHEM. PROC. LAW
§ 220.10(5) (a) (ii) (McKinney 1997) [hereinafter C.P.L.1; P.L. § 70.00, In certain limited situ-
ations where the accused is "providing material assistance" to law enforcement officials, a sentence
of lifetime probation is possible upon conviction of a class A-II felony. P.L. § 65.00(1)(6).
261 The superseding indictment would charge the defendant with criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the first degree, a Class A-I felony. § 220.43(1) defines criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the first degree as knowingly and unlawfully selling two or IROrC ounces
of a narcotic drug. A Class A-I felony carries a minimum sentence of fifteen years to life
imprisonment and a maximum of twenty-five years to life. See P.L. § 70.00(2), (3).
265 The lowest permissible charge reduction and sentence for an adult charged with a Class
A-I felony is to an A-I1 felony with a sentence of three years to life imprisonment. See C.P.L.
§ 220.10(5) (a) (I); P.L. § 70.00. In certain cases where the defendant is cooperating with law
enforcement authorities, a sentence of lifetime probation is permissible upon conviction of an
A-II felony. See suina note 263,
2"6 Defense counsel testified at length at a hearing on the defendant's motion for an order
vacating his conviction on the ground, inter alia, of constitutionally inadequate representation of
counsel. He stated repeatedly his view that it is the client's decision whether to plead guilty, and
that his role does not include shepherding the client into doing what the lawyer thinks is best.
As a result, he did not specifically advise his client whether to accept or reject the plea. Rather,
he laid out numerous factors that were part of the calculus of that decision. See the transcript of
the hearing [hereinafter 1-1.1 on file with the author at 27-28, 50, 52-53, 56, 60.
267 Boria v. Keane, 83 F.3d 48, 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment. 268
 Although it was clear that counsel did relay the offer to his
client,269
 and did discuss many facets of the offer in relation to the
charges against the defendant, counsel's failure to discuss with the
defendant the advisability of accepting or rejecting the offered plea
amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Put another way, it
was not enough for counsel to spell out the options, sentence implica-
tions and likelihood of success at trial; the defendant had a "constitu-
tional right to be advised whether or not the offered bargain 'ap-
pcar[cd] to be desirable." 27°
The number of opinions that the court issued in the case reflects
the significance of the court's holding. In the first, 27 ' the court cited
Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam's Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of
Criminal Cases (hereinafter Trial Manual) 272
 For the proposition that
the defense attorney "must give the client the benefit of counsel's profes-
sional advice" on the crucial question of whether to plead guilty.'" The
court went on to quote the Trial Manual at length:
[O]ften counsel can protect the client from disaster only by
using a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the
client that a plea which the client instinctively disfavors is, in
fact, in his or her best interest. This persuasion is most often
needed to convince the client that s/he should plead guilty
in a case in which a not guilty plea would be destructive'
Subsequently, the prosecution petitioned the court for rehearing
on an unrelated issue. 275
 The court denied the prosecutor's motion,
but used the occasion to , try to clarify its initial holding. 276 In a footnote,
263 U.S. CONST. amend, VI.
269 IL is well-settled that the failure of defense counsel to inform the defendant of an offered
plea bargain can amount to the deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See
supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
27° Bcnia, 83 F.3d at 54 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1992)).
271 See id. at 48.
272 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR 'ME DEVI:NSF: OF CRIMINAL CASES (1989).
273 83 F.3d at 52 (emphasis in original) (quoting TRIAL MANUAL 5, § 201, at 339). The opinion
says that "the word 'must' was emphasized by the author; otherwise, the emphasis is ours." 83
F.3d at 53. In fact, the author, Professor Amsterdam, did not use any emphasis.
274 Id. at 52-53 (emphasis in original). Interestingly, the court in Napper, supra note 208, one
of the few cases to find that counsel's neutrality on the plea decision is ineffective assistance, also
cited this passage from Amsterdam's TRIAL MANUAL.
275 The prosecution moved for rehearing, alleging that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 should be applied retroactively to the defendant's habeas corpus petition.
276 Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the court stated, "the initial opinion in this case did not hold that it is
ineffective assistance of counsel when a lawyer's advice regarding the
wisdom of accepting or rejecting a plea offer fails to convince the
client. We held only that the absence of any advice constitutes ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel . . . "2"
Several months later, apparently without motion by either the
prosecution or the defense, the court reified and reissued its opin-
ion. 27B The third and final version of Boria continues to quote the Trial
Manual's exhortation that counsel "must give the client the benefit of
counsel's professional advice" on the decision whether to accept a plea, 279
but the rest of that paragraph, , regarding the use of considerable
persuasion to convince the client to plead guilty to avoid disaster, has
been deleted without comment. 28°
The court's repeated efforts to explain and limit its holding in
Boria are subject to several interpretations. The ruling did riot generate
audible, resounding approval from criminal defense attorneys. In fact,
a segment of the criminal defense bar voiced concerns with the court's
decision. 28 ' The author of the opinions, Judge Whitman Knapp, has
said that the controversial language from Amsterdam's Trial Manual
should have been deleted from the first opinion, but made it into the
published opinion due to a "snafu." 282 When asked why that language
2" /d. at 37 n.2.
278 See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996).
MM. at 497 (emphasis in original). Once again, the court wrote that "the word 'must' was
emphasized by the author; otherwise, the emphasis is ours." Id. In fact, the word "must" was not
emphasized by Professor Amsterdam.
NO There is only one other change in the opinion, Originally, the court prefaced its quotation
of the Tabu. MANUAL by noting that Professor 'Amsterdam "discusses the question (of the defense
attorney's duty to advise regarding the desirability of a plea) in more detail." Boria, 83 F.3d at 52.
The final opinion, in an apparent effort to minimize the significance of the language in the TRIAL
MANUAL, states merely that Professor Amsterdam "observed." Boria, 99 F.3d at 496.
281
 See, e.g., Robert C.; Morvillo, Reasoned Strategic Choice or Ineffective Counsel?, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
3, 1996, at 3 (observing that the court was indicating a "willingness to sccondguess apparent
'strategic choices' made by defense attorneys," and that "Fri riminal defense practitioners should
take note" because actions previously "shielded from ineffective assistance attack . . . might no
longer be unassailable") .,In a subsequent letter to the editor, Morvillo explained that his article
referred to the first Boria opinion. In his view; the final decision, by eliminating any reference to
the need for defense counsel to use "persuasion," avoided putting attorneys in the position of
being accused of coercing clients, and therefore ameliorated the concerns he expressed in his
article. See Robert G. Morvillo, Letter to Editor, N.Y.LJ., Dec, 6, 1996, at 2. In the President's
Column in The Champion, a publication of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL"), Judy Clarke communicated ambivalence about the decision, but pointed out the
importance of the case and the necessity for defense attorneys to confront the myriad issues
involved when counseling clients. NACDL, Judy Clarke, President's Column: A Conscience Check,
THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at 9.
282 Telcphone interview with Judge WhitMan Knapp, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, (Mar. 24, 1997).
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should have been deleted, Judge Knapp responded that he "agree[d]
with it, but it's not constitutional." 2" In his view, adopting a require-
ment that in certain circumstances counsel must attempt to convince
clients to plead guilty would create appellate issues. He suggested the
difficulty and impracticality of attempting to assess whether an attor-
ney's efforts at convincing a client were sufficient.'"
What Boria certainly highlights is the visceral reaction to the situ-
ation where a defendant rejects a plea, goes to trial and receives a
sentence greatly in excess of the plea offer. Contrast that with a case
where a defendant pleads guilty, receives a bargained-for sentence and
now claims that she would have prevailed at trial had she not pleaded
guilty. In the former case, the defendant actually serves a much longer
sentence than she otherwise had to (for example, one to three years
versus life); in the latter, there is only a claim that perhaps the defen-
dant would have been acquitted. 285 Within this framework, it becomes
apparent that counsel must do more than simply advise a client
whether to plead or not. In order to avoid the type of disaster that
befell Oscar Boria, an attorney must attempt to persuade a client to
accept the attorney's recommendation. One need only imagine the
following hypothetical exchange between the defendant and his attor-
ney in Boria:
Counsel: Based on all that we have discussed, I believe that
you should accept the offer.
Boria: No.
It seems hard to imagine that the Second Circuit would have found
this additional "counseling" to have satisfied the Sixth Amendment.
Surely, some effort on the part of defense counsel to persuade the
client is necessary.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit has considered the counseling
obligations of defense attorneys in other recent cases. In Dean v.
Super-intendent, 286 the defendant claimed ineffective assistance because
283 Id.
281
285 1 am grateful to my colleague David Garland for highlighting other troubling aspects of
the case, particularly the questions raised by a system that deems sentences of one to three years
and 20 years to life as appropriate for the same act. Much scholarship concerns the practice of
defendants' receiving greater punishment when convicted after trial. See, e.g., FEELEY, Supra note
133; Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Cul. L. REV. 931, 978-94 (1983); Alschuler, supra note 99; David
Brereton & Johnathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the
Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC Y REV. 45, 55-61 (1981-82). That important and
disturbing part of the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this Article.
286 93 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1996),
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his attorney had put. on an insanity defense over his objection. The
court observed that "[d]efense counsel's task in tempering his or her
judgment as a trained advocate with his or her responsibilities as
counsel is a delicate one." 287 The court then quoted with approval the
entire passage from the Trial Manual (including the admonition that
"often counsel can protect the client from disaster only by using a considerable
amount of persuasion to convince the client"). 288 The court then noted
that "a court reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
on the imposition of an insanity defense must be careful not to con-
fuse, through the prism of hindsight, persuasion with coercion and
disagreement with objection."289 The court ruled that, in order to
prevail, the defendant must show that he objected to the insanity
defense or that his will was overborne by counsel, In finding that the
defendant failed to meet this test, the court alluded to the "vigor with
which competent defense counsel advises a client on a strategic deci-
sion as significant as an insanity defense or plea," 290 and noted that
although the defendant initially disagreed with defense counsel, "he
ultimately acquiesced to the more experienced judgment of a trained
advocate. "291
Even more recently, the court revisited the nature of defense
counsel's counseling obligations. In Brown v. Artuz,292 the issue was the
attorney's role with respect to the defendant's right to testify at trial.
The court determined that the right to testify is personal to the defen-
dant, but that "the burden of ensuring that the defendant is informed
of the nature and existence of the right to testify rests upon defense
counsel," 2"3 and is a necessary component of the effective assistance of
counsel. As to the parameters of the attorney's counseling require-
ments, the court noted that the attorney may "strongly advise the
course that counsel thinks best."2 94
As the Second Circuit grapples with delineating the constitutional
counseling obligations of defense attorneys, it. is sending a clear signal
that counsel may, and should, fully and forcefully voice their opinions
as to the best course of action, and attempt to convince their Clients
to accept their advice. By noting approvingly the "vigor" 205 with which
competent counsel advises a client on significant decisions, and the
287
 hi. at 62.
298 Id. (emphasis in original).
289
209 Id.
231 93 F.3d at 63.
292 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997).
2951d. at 79 .
2"1 Id.
295 Dean, 99 F.3d at 62.
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client's "ultimately acquiesc[ing]"m to the more experienced judg-
ment of counsel, the court encourages defense lawyers to take an active
role in the plea decision.
It is instructive to view counseling in terms of a continuum, with
neutrality at one end and urging at the other: 297
neutral — suggest — advise — urge
An attorney is neutral when she attempts to take no position with
a client as to the advisability of accepting or rejecting a plea. The
attorney refrains from phrases such as, "perhaps you might con-
sider" or "in my opinion you should," and instead tries to convey
impartiality. By suggest, I mean mentioning or implying as a possi-
bility, or offering for consideration. 298 Taken literally, suggestion
includes an attorney's saying, "I suggest that you consider the pos-
sibility of . . .." For present purposes, to advise is to offer an opinion
on the wisdom of pleading guilty or opting for tria1, 2" as, for exam-
ple, "I advise you to accept/reject the plea offer." An attorney urges
a particular choice when she advocates or demands earnestly or
pressingly that a client accept the decision that she recommends."'
In order to delineate counsel's constitutional counseling obliga-
tions, it is necessary to consider this continuum in the context of the
permissive (what counsel may do), the hortatory or aspirational (what
counsel should do), and the required (what counsel must do). Before
Soria, the range of constitutionally permissible behavior was expansive,
ranging from neutrality to aggressively urging a client to make a par-
ticular decision. Although there were some general pronouncements
about what counsel should do, the only affirmative obligations were
that counsel conform to the general standards of Strickland and, in
essence, perform in a reasonable manner."' As a result, the attorney's
role was circumscribed only to the limited extent that counsel must
296
 Id. at 63.
2g7 The idea of a continuum is borrowed from Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 569.
299 WEa5-rEtt's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1179 (9th cd. 1991) [hereinafter WEB-
STER'S]. Dinerstein describes suggestion as "a mild form of advice stated in tentative terms." See
Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 569 11.306 (citing A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW 128 (2d
ed. 1974)).
299 See, e.g., Binder, Bergman Sc Price, Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach, 35
N.Y.L. Sell. L. RE.v. 29, 33 (1990).
21%WEBSTER'S, Supra note 298, at 1298.
391 See Dill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984).The only hint that there were in fact some counseling requirements appeared in cases
where counsel took a neutral position and the client pleaded guilty to the highest charge and
MaXitIttlIn sentence. Expressing some concern that the constitutional obligation of effective
assistance might mandate more than neutrality, some courts observed that ill "special" or "un-
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inform the client of a plea offer," must provide accurate and complete
information," and must ensure that any advice, opinions or predic-
tions she chooses to provide are reasonable."'
The counseling prohibitions were similarly general and uninfor-
mative. Put simply, counsel must not coerce a client into making a
particular decision. In legal terms, a defendant has been impermissibly
coerced when, as opposed to his disagreeing with and then ultimately
acquiescing to his attorney, the defendant's will was overborne." 5 Typi-
cally, coercion connotes images of attorneys browbeating clients into
doing their bidding (usually in the form of pleading guilty). Viewed in
this context, the issue becomes identifying the point at which efforts
at persuasion crossed over into intolerable coercion. It is critical,
though, to bear in mind that a lawyer's neutrality can be equally
coercive. Contrast the effect on a defendant when counsel, who has
investigated and researched the case thoroughly, takes the time and
effort to try to persuade the client to make a particular decision, with
that when counsel, in essence, says, "it's up to you." Similarly, a client's
will can be overborne in subtle ways, such as the lawyer's choices of
what to discuss and the way in which she presents those choices. 306
The by-product of this lack of vigorous regulation was that counsel
were permitted to offer no advice whatsoever. At the opposite end of
the spectrum, counsel could go to great lengths to pressure clients to
accept their advice. That this critical aspect of lawyering—counseling
defendants as to the advisability of accepting or rejecting a plea—could
be left to the vagaries of attorney preferences in individual cases is
alarming.
The holding in Boria should be viewed in light of the situation
described above, and in that context has profound implications for
criminal defense lawyering. It is enlightening to return to the notion
of a continuum and then to analyze the effects of Boria. It is now
abundantly clear that an attorney's neutral stance on the wisdom of
pleading guilty will not pass constitutional muster. Providing an opin-
ion as to which alternative seems to be more advantageous is "consti-
usual" circumstances, counsel should take a more active role in the counseling process. See supra
notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
"5 See, e.g., Dean, 93 F,3d at 62; United States v. Teague, 953 F.2(1 1525,1535 (111.11 Cir. 1992)
(defendant's will not overborne regarding the decision whether to testify at trial).
9°6 See, e.g., Uphoff, supra note 31, at 81,131 (noting that clients can be influenced in subtle
ways, and that the line between "reasonable persuasion" and "manipulation" is not a bright one).
See also text accompanying notes 343-44 infra.
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tutionally required advice" in the Second Circuit." Furthermore, the
holding makes no distinction between cases where counsel's neutrality
results in the defendant's pleading guilty and those in which it results
in his opting for trial. The attorney must provide an opinion as to the
best course of action in any case 3o8
The decision also does not countenance mere suggestion. Instead,
effective assistance requires that counsel advise and offer an opinion
on the crucial plea decision. In essence, the court constitutionalized
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration
7-7, which provides that "[a] defense lawyer in a criminal case has the
duty to advise his [sic] client fully whether a particular plea to a charge
appears to be desirable."" The court stated that the defendant has a
"constitutional right to be advised whether or not the offered bargain
`appeared to be desirable." 3 ")
Moving along the continuum, the critical question arises as to
whether counsel may, should or must urge a client to accept the
attorney's advice. The court in Boria did not impose such a constitu-
tional obligation on defense counsel, but nor did it address the issue
directly. Rather, in its second opinion, the court explained that it did
not hold that it is ineffective assistance when an attorney fails to
convince a client to accept her advice regarding the wisdom of accept-
ing a plea. The court, focusing on the result of the counseling, did not
discuss whether the effort to persuade was necessary. There can be no
doubt, however, that the court believed that such an effort should be
made. The court observed that no cases in the Second Circuit dealt
with the question of an attorney's obligation when the client refuses
to accept an offer that is clearly in the client's "best interests." The
court noted that "[t]his lack of specific decision undoubtedly arises
from the circumstance that such duty is so well understood by lawyers
practicing in this Circuit that the question has never been litigated."
This view is consonant with the numerous decisions upholding attor-
neys' uses of all manners of pressure to convince clients to accept or
307 See Boria, 99 F.3d at 497,
"9 The holding does not limit itself to cases of "special" or "unusual" circumstances. See supra
notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
"9
 Monet. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1992).
310 Barba, 99 F.3d at 498 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1992) (emphasis added)). The attorney's duty to offer an opinion has been recognized in related
circumstances. See, e.g., Von Moltke v, Gitlies, 332 U.S. 708,721 (1948).
Ill
	 99 F.3d at 996 (emphasis added); see also Dinerstein, supra note 249, at 977 n,15
("In practice, judges often assume that experienced lawyers will be able to persuade their clients
to accept what the lawyer believes is in their best interest, and that such persuasion is both
appropriate and necessary.").
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reject a plea. 3 ' 9 At a minimum, counsel has a "duty" to try to convince
a client to accept the attorney's advice on the plea decision.
The unequivocal and clear language of Boria, requiring that coun-
sel advise a client on the desirability of a proffered plea bargain, creates
a split in the courts of appeals. In Jones v. Murray," the Fourth Circuit
held that neutrality, or the withholding of advice, was permissible. The
court held that creating a "binding rule of conduct in all cases" ran
afoul of the admonitions in Strickland,'" and cited Nix v. Whiteside' 15
for the proposition that "[a] court must be careful not to narrow the
wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so
restrictively as to consfitutionalize particular standards of professional
conduct . . . . "316 Yet, "constitutionaliz[ing] particular standards of pro-
fessional conduct" is precisely what the court did in Boria. 317
The decisions in Jones and Boria both purport to find justi-
fication in professional ethical standards. The court in Jones began
its analysis of the attorney's conduct by looking to the American
Bar Association's standards in order to assess whether counsel vio-
lated prevailing professional nortns. 3 's The court focused on the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice HI, Standard 4-3.2 3 ' 9 and the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice II, Standards 4-5.1 320 and 4—
312 See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text. Although the court in Burin did not
explicitly require that counsel seek to persuade a client to plead guilty in a case where the attorney
believes a plea is necessary in order to avoid disastrous consequences, it seems that rarely, if ever,
will such attempts be found to amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel.
313 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991).
314 Id. at 1111 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89) ("No particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent .a criminal defen-
dant.").
315 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
316 947 F.2d at 1111 (citing Nix, 475 U.S. at 165).
317 See supra text accompanying note 270.
316 1n Strickland, the Court suggested that the American Bar Association standards were useful
as "guides to determining what is reasonable." 466 U.S. at 688.
318 MIA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.2(a) states that "(d]efense counsel should
. . . ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty . is ultimately made by the
defendant." Subsection (b) provides that " itlo aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense
counsel, after appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the alternatives available
and considerations deemed important by defense counsel or the defendant in reaching a deci-
sion." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(a), (b) (2d ed.
Supp. 1986) J hereinafter ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY].
32B ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.1(a) specifics that "1aJfter informing himself
or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel should advise the accused with complete
candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome."
Subsection (b) states that "I di efense counsel should not intentionally understate or overstate the
risks, hazards, or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused's decision as to
his or her plea." ABA STANDARDS row CRIMINAL JUS'FICL, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
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5.2(a) (1). 321 The court held that counsel acted in accordance with
these standards by fully advising his client about available alternatives
and other important considerations, and by ensuring that the decision
was ultimately made by the defendant. The court in Boria considered
only one ethical standard, the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, Ethical Consideration 7-7. 3" The court in Boria did not discuss
the standards explicated in Jones; in fact it made no reference to
Jones."'
The decision in Boria mandates a reevaluation of the applicability
of client-centered counseling to criminal cases. Defense counsel in
Boria took a traditional client-centered approach to counseling. He
testified at the post-conviction hearing that "in relationship to any plea
it's the client's decision in regard to what he or she wishes to do." 3"
He testified unequivocally on the central issue: "I don't recall ever
advising Mr. Boria to accept or reject the plea."325 When asked whether
he was familiar with the duty to advise encompassed by Ethical Con-
sideration 7-7,326 he answered that he was aware of it, and in his view,
had complied with it. 327 He described his role by stating, "I was giving
FusurtoN § 4-5.1 (a), (b) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION]. The commentary
to this standard, after observing that the decision whether to plead is ultimately for the defendant
to make, provides that "[Alice the lawyer has concluded that it is in the best interests of the
accused to enter a guilty plea, it is proper for the lawyer to use reasonable persuasion to guide
the client to a sound decision." ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1 commentary.
321 ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2(a) (I ) states that the decision whether to accept a plea
agreement is ultimately for the accused to make after full consultation with counsel. ABA DEFENSE
FUNCTION, supra note 320. The commentary to this section adds that "lapthough it is highly
improper for counsel to demand that the defendant follow what counsel perceives as the desirable
course or for counsel to coerce a client's decision through misrepresentation or undue influence,
counsel is free to engage in fair persuasion and to urge the client to follow the proffered
professional advice. Ultimately, however, because of the fundamental nature of decisions such as
these, so crucial to the accused's fate, the accused must make the decisions himself or herself."
ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 320, § 4-5.2 commentary.
322 EC 7-7 provides that "[a] defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client
fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable . . ." MonEr. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1992).
323 Nor for that matter did the Janes court mention Ethical Consideration 7-7 and its clear
language imposing a duty on defense counsel to inform clients whether a plea appears to be
advisable. It seems that the ABA Standards are no snore helpful than the Model Rules and the
Model Code in delineating precisely counsel's role in the decisionmaking process. See supra notes
233-34 and accompanying text.
324	 note 266, at 28.
325 1 1., supra note 266, at 56. At other points during his testimony he made the same point
abundantly clear. See, e.g., II., supra note 266, at 60 ("Q - And when did you first advise Mr. Boria
with respect to accepting or rejecting the proffered plea? A - I never did.").
326 See supra note 322.
327 11, supra note 266, at 236-37.
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advice and counseling him. I am a lawyer. That is what I do." 328 It seems
clear that this counseling, deemed constitutionally deficient by the
Second Circuit, comports quite well with the Binder, Bergman and
Price model of client-centered counseling. Binder, Bergman and Price
begin with the premises that "clients generally should have the oppor-
tunity to make decisions,"329 and that "[e] ffective counseling usually
calls for the appearance of neutrality.""° Defense counsel in Boria
expressed similar sentiments during his lengthy testimony. The authors
now reject the radical view that advocates that counsel never provide
advice or opinions about. what a client ought to do."' Their position
presently is that "[a]lthough you ultimately may provide a client with
an opinion when asked, you should do so only after having thoroughly
counseled a client."332 By making advice-giving a permitted, rather than
required, feature of counseling, and by limiting it to situations when
the client solicits advice, the model runs afoul of the holding in
Boria.333 The dissonance between the Binder, Bergman and Price
model of counseling and the analysis in Boria reflects the authors' lack
of careful attention to the demands of criminal defense practice. As
the authors analyze and discuss the role of the attorney in the coun-
seling process, they do not address the constitutional requirements
imposed on attorneys in criminal cases by virtue of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel .334
Boria also compels different counseling methods from those em-
ployed by Dinerstein333 and Simon.336 In Dinerstein's case, the student
attorneys should, at a minimum, have advised their client about the
desirability of the plea offer. Spelling out the options and predicting
the legal consequences, much as did the lawyer in Boria, is insufficient.
328 1d. at 184.
3 '29 Binder, Bergman & Price, supra note '299, at 33.
330 Id. at 64. The authors also stale that 'In] eutrality requires that you appear to have no
favorites among the available alternatives." Id.
031 See id. at 54; see also supra note 240 and accompanying text.
332 Binder, Bergman & Price, supra note 299, at 54.
333 Another scholar's view of client-centered counseling maintains the permissive nature of
advice-giving, but allows attorneys to advise clients, in certain circumstances, without having to
wait for the client's request. See Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 570.
331 As one scholar points out, Binder and Price do not confront the significance of Ethical
Consideration 7-7's mandate that criminal defense attorneys have a duty to advise their clients
as to whether a plea offer appears desirable. See Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 535 11.154. In fact,
Dinerstein found that of the 140 Limes when it was possible to identify the subject matter of the
examples used by Binder, Bergman and Price,mtly 13 related to the criminal law. See Dincrstciu,
supra note 224, at 699 11.5.
335 See .supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
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Attempting to persuade their client—the next step in the continuum—
was, although a difficult proposition, necessary." 7
 Dinerstein's recount-
ing of his thought processes on the eve of trial, leading him to empha-
size to the students the importance of telling their client that they
anticipated a conviction, suggests that in his opinion accepting the
negotiated disposition was the best choice. If true, they should have
informed the client and attempted to persuade her to adopt that
recommendation. Simon's case is straightforward. His client, Mrs.
Jones, asked for his advice. He, as well as his co-counsel, should have
complied with that request.'" In fact, they were obligated to give their
opinions even if their client had not sought them out. As Simon
concludes, "[A]ny plausible conception of good practice will often
require lawyers to make judgments about clients' best interests and to
influence clients to adopt those judgments."""
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
It is no longer reasonable to argue that counsel should play a
neutral role in the crucial decision of whether to plead guilty. It is not
a matter of personal feelings, strategy or ethics, but a constitutional
mandate. The result reached in Boria v. Keane was correct, but the
court should have retained the language from its original opinion that
exhorted defense attorneys to advise clients whether to plead guilty or
proceed to trial, and, if necessary, to attempt to persuade clients to
accept their advice.
Prior to Boria, the constitutional analysis of a lawyer's neutrality
centered on whether counsel's performance, i.e., remaining neutral,
was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms. 34°
Boria, in effect, holds that neutrality is per se unreasonable. Defense
counsel is required by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the effec-
tive assistance of counsel to provide an opinion. This result is logical
and appropriate. By countenancing neutrality, the courts created an
anomalous situation. If a lawyer gave advice, she was subject to a
337 Given the client's statement that she was unhappy with her prior attorney because he had
"strongly urged" her to accept a negotiated disposition, and that she apparently had some sort
of emotional or mental problems, the prospects of trying to persuade her were daunting. Ott the
other hand, by not weighing in, the student attorneys could be seen by their client as agreeing
with her decision to litigate the case at trial, a decision that proved to be unfortunate.
338
 Often, in the attorney's estimation, the advisability of accepting or rejecting a plea offer
is not clear. In those situations, counsel should advise the client consistent with that proposition.
See supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
339 See Simon, supra note 253, at 213.
390 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
July 1998]	 CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING 	 895
reasonableness review, but if she declined to offer an opinion, she was
in a sense insulated From scrutiny. Although the decision to withhold
advice was subject to examination, there was no particular advice to
analyze under prevailing professional norms. The message to defense
attorneys was that venturing an opinion put you at greater risk of
appellate review."
From a pragmatic standpoint, it is also prudent to mandate that
attorneys provide opinions about the wisdom of accepting a plea offer.
Pure neutrality is not possible. 312 Attorneys will inevitably imply what
they think a client should do and influence a client's decision by
selecting what information to present343 and how to convey 4. 34' There
is also a distinct possibility that when the attorney attempts to convey
data neutrally and not provide opinions, the client will attempt to guess
which choice the attorney favors.
Once it is necessary to advise and urge acceptance of the advice,
the remaining issues arc determining what advice to impart, and how
to convey it. The content of the advice, whether to accept or reject a
plea offer, will depend on the particular case. 3" Among the relevant
considerations are the strength of the prosecution's case, the merits of
the defense theory of the case, the possible consequences of a convic-
541 See, e.g., United States v. Jerome, 933 F. Supp. 989, 995 (D.C. Nev. 1996) (the court
emphasized that counsel did not advise the defendant what to do, and that it was unaware of any
authority for the suggestion that the failure to make a recominendation can amount to ineffective
assistance).
542 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 580 ("Client-centered lawyering stresses the desir-
ability of the lawyer's neutrality towards the client's ends. But such neutrality is inevitably false;
as sentient and feeling beings, lawyers cannot help but have opinions about what their clients
should do, and cannot help but have those opinions affect how they relate to clients."); William
H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: 4 Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the
Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1994) ("There is no value-free
mode of communication in which clients could be presented with unfiltered information needed
for decision."); FHOMAS L. SIIAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
IN A NUTSHELL 131-32 (2d ed. 1987),
345 See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 227, at 746 (counsel must simplify the vast possibilities;
developing a list of optiOns and their advantages and disadvantages offers countless opportunities
for attorney influence); Simon, supra note 253, at 217; Spiegel, supra note 218, at 325 (a lawyer's
decisions about what information to include can significantly affect client decisions).
344 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1988);
Simon, supra note 253, at 217 (IL] awyers influence clients by myriad judgments, conscious or
itot, about what information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style and
phrasing to adopt."); Spiegel, supra note 218. at 326 ("This problem of having an inevitable
influence on client choice cannot be avoided .... There is no completely neutral point from
which to decide what information to include, how to describe it, and what clarifying interventions
are appropriate.").
345 Addressing all the sundry factors that go into this evaluative process, although critically
important, is beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, determining the optimal timing of this
crucial counseling is an important consideration that merits a separate study. Ideally, the attorney
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tion and, of course, the defendant's objectives and concerns."' For
many, if not most, defendants, the primary concern is maintaining, or
regaining, their liberty. 347 The likelihood of receiving a much more
severe sentence if convicted after trial leads many defendants to enter
guilty pleas in order to reduce their exposure.348
It is insufficient for a lawyer merely to give an opinion, devoid of
the predicate for the recommendation. Counsel should provide her
opinion and the bases for it. To do otherwise renders the advice hollow.
The client is entitled to, and will need to know, the reasons why the
attorney favors a particular decision. In the course of explaining thor-
oughly her rationale, the lawyer will inevitably engage in an effort to
persuade the client of the wisdom of her advice. This marshaling of
the factors that led the attorney to advocate for a particular decision
should be done deliberately, consciously and openly, as a necessary
component of counseling about the merits of a plea offer. The client's
decision will then be the fully informed product of forthright, honest
representation.
Even after thorough counseling, a client might disagree with the
attorney's advice. The question then is the extent to which counsel
should persist, and the method to be used, in urging the client to
accept the recommendation. Professor Amsterdam writes that "[t]he
limits of allowable persuasion arc fixed by the lawyer's conscience." 349
Another scholar observed that "some rather forceful language may be
necessary," and referred to the use of "badgering," "cajolery," and
"verbal abuse."35° Often, counsel's persuasion is of a more subtle na-
ture.351 Defense counsel should attempt to persuade a client to accept
will have developed a relationship of mutual trust and respect with his or her client, see, e.g., ABA
DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 320, § 4-3.1; Goodpaster, supra note 24, at 74 ("The major
obligation of defense counsel is to try and make herself effective. This means .. attempting to
develop an effective working relationship with the defendant."), and will have completed factual
and legal research, see, e.g., ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 320, §§ 4-4,1, and 4-6,1(6)
Ciitinder no circumstances should defense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a
plea unless appropriate investigation ... has been completed ...."). Often, counsel will not have
had sufficient opportunity to achieve these goals prior to having to discuss the advisability of a
plea offer, but it is the ideal to strive for.
346 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM, supra note 272, at 340-43.
347 See, e.g., Roy B. Flemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public Defenders in
America's Criminal Courts, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 393, 401-02 (1989); Jerome II. Skolnick, Social
Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CoxiTicr REsoL. 52, 62 (1967) (discussing the defense
approach that "emphasizes decisions most likely to maximize gain and minimize loss in the
negatively valued commodity of penal 'time.'").
348 See supra note 285.
949 Am5TERDAm, supra note 272, at 339.
55° Alschuler, supra note 99, at 1309-10.
55 ' See, e.g., Simon, supra note 253, at 216 (describing art attorney influencing a client to
plead guilty by, among other things, choosing to discuss the disadvantages of a trial last).
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advice in a manner consistent with an empathetic and compassionate
approach to counseling." 2
Obviously, the difficulty of the decision affects the attorney's ap-
proach to counseling. If, after weighing all the factors, 353 the attorney
believes that the best choice is insufficiently clear, the nature of the
advising will be different from when the attorney believes the best
choice is evident. One need only contrast the situation where counsel
estimates that an acquittal is unlikely and a severe sentence after trial
is expected, with one where counsel believes that the chances of a
conviction and increased sentence are by no means clear. The clearer
the choice, the more counsel should attempt to influence a client's
decision."' Counsel should assert her opinion commensurate with the
clarity of her decision, and so as to ensure that the client understands
completely her advice and its foundation.
Courts have recognized the need for this type of assessment. In
Commonwealth v. Napper,"' counsel's neutrality was ineffective because
the attorney determined that the case was a "stone cold loser"3" yet
failed to advise his client to accept the plea offer. Similarly, in Boria,357
the court likely found ineffectiveness in large part because of counsel's
statements that he believed the possibility of an acquittal was remote
and that the decision to go to trial was, in effect, "suicidal."'"
Even in situations where counsel exerts tremendous efforts to
persuade the client, there will be occasions when the client rejects
counsel's advice. In fact, because the accused makes the final decision,
the attorney must strive to leave room for disagreement and must make
sure that the client is aware that she will represent him zealously in any
event.'" Obviously, this is a delicate task, and counsel must be vigilant
352 See infra note 363 and accompanying text.
353 See supra note 345 and accompanying text; see also Uphoff, supra note 31, at 131 r(lllow
hard counsel can lean turns on the seriousness of the case, the harm facing the defendant, the
client's ability to make informed decisions, the certainty of the harm, the client's rationale for
his or her decision and the means used to change the defendant's mind.").
s54 What happens when counsel believes there is no clear best choice? That conclusion itself
should become the advice required by Rena. Although it is neutral in that counsel is not making
a particular recommendation, the client is not left alone trying to guess what the attorney thinks
or what is the optimal choice. Contrast that "neutrality" with a lawyer who says nothing regarding
the merits of a plea versus trial. The advice is "neutral" only to the extent that it does not
recommend a particular choice; it is not neutral in the sense that counsel remains silent as to
this critical decision.
S55 385 A.2d 521 (Pa. Superior Ct. 1978).
355 1d. at 522.
3"99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996).
35K Id. at 495. Contrast with the situation in Jones it Murray where counsel estimated a 70%
probability of conviction. 947 K2d at 1110.
359 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM, SUM note 272, at 339 ("Of course, s/he must make absolutely clear
to the client that if the client insists on pleading not guilty when the lawyer thinks a guilty plea
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so as not to cause irreparable damage to the attorney-client relation-
ship, especially in cases where the client chooses to proceed to trial.
This necessary risk dictates that counsel must give careful thought to
the method, as well as the content, of counseling.
Adopting this approach to counseling will necessitate changes in
the analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Evaluating
whether a lawyer offered an opinion is a straightforward inquiry. It is
also not difficult to determine if a lawyer attempted to convince a client
to accept that opinion. It. is, however, a formidable challenge to assess
the extent and quality of counsel's efforts to persuade. Prior to Boria,
the issue was whether counsel's neutrality was reasonable, or, if counsel
ventured an opinion that the client rejected, whether the decision not
to try to persuade was reasonable. If counsel were required to offer an
opinion and to try to prevail upon a client to accept it, the focus would
become the nature and quality of the attempt. Although a difficult
task,'6° examining whether counsel's efforts were within the range of
acceptable professional behavior is an analysis similar to that which the
courts have already been undertaking.
The rationale for this view of counseling in criminal cases extends
beyond constitutional interpretations of the meaning of effective assis-
tance. As a general matter, when someone hires a professional, the
client expects and demands the benefit of the professional's training,
experience, and hopefully, wisdom. Although the plea decision is the
defendant's, courts have observed that "it is the attorney, not the client,
who is particularly qualified to make an informed evaluation of a
proffered plea bargain." 9s' Imagine that a medical emergency leads you
to consult with a doctor. The doctor carefully and meticulously lays out
your options but does not give an opinion as to which course of action
she recommends. Surely, you would expect that you are entitled to her
expert opinion and not just. her information. In fact, we arc all too
familiar with stories of doctors, and indeed lawyers, declining to offer
opinions for fear of being subjected to lawsuits if their advice turns out
wise, the lawyer will nevertheless defend the client vigorously and will raise every defense that
the client legitimately has."); Alschulcr, supra note 99, at 1310 (arguing that a lawyer should not
be permitted to threaten a client that she will withdraw front the case unless the client accepts
the advice).
36°See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving
Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL L. REV. 323, 375-76 (arguing that counsel should have a duty to
seek to establish a relationship of trust with the client, but acknowledging that the courts are not
well-equipped to evaluate counsel's efforts in that regard).
" I In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 933 (Cal. 1992); see also AMSTERDAM, supra note 272, at
339 ("iClounsers appraisal of the case is probably better than the defendant's.").
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to be incorrect. 362 The patient, or client, requires, and is entitled to,
the professional's opinion, augmented by its underlying justifications.
It is critical, however, that the training, experience and wisdom
must be combined with compassion and empathy. "i 9 An attorney mo-
tivated by empathy, and acting with compassion, will provide the client
with all the reasons, all that she is weighing, as part of a conversation
with the client, so that the client will appreciate the grounds for the
advice. Counsel must allow ample opportunity for the client to ask
questions and voice concerns. Returning to the medical analogy, a
patient's expectation, or hope, is that a doctor will not simply tell her
which option to pursue, but instead will define the options, offer an
opinion, and explain the bases for that opinion carefully, compassion-
ately and responsively.
Professors Binder, Bergman and Price emphasize that "decisions
should be made on the basis of what choice is most likely to provide a
client with maximum satisfaction."" ,4 They argue that client decisionmak-
ing increases the likelihood that clients will attain "maximum satisfac-
tion."365 This does not militate against an attorney attempting to per-
suade a client. If an attorney assumes a more active role in the
decisionmaking process, offers advice, and when necessary, attempts
to persuade a client to accept that advice, the goal of client satisfaction
is more likely to be achieved because the client's decision will be the
informed result of thorough attorney-client discourse.
Numerous studies document the dissatisfaction that many crimi-
nal defendants feel toward their appointed lawyers. 566 Perhaps the
primary complaint is that their attorneys tell them what to do rather
562 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 575 (suggesting that when lawyers decline to give
advice, clients might suspect that the attorney's motivation is to avoid malpractice liability).
fi3 See, e.g., Stephen Ellinann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665
(1993) (an ethic of care leading to more intervention by the attorney); Charles Ogletree, Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 I IARV. L. REV. 1239, 1271-75
(1993) (extolling the value of empathy in the practice of indigent defense). The Ana&ican Bar
Association Standards state that "defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust
and confidence with the accused ...." ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 320, § 4-3,1; see also
Berger, supra note 65, at 52 ("Because a defense attorney plays so many roles in our system of
justice—advocate, adviser, negotiator, spokesperson, champion and, sometimes, friend—the ac-
cused's interest in the quality of his rapport with counsel lies at the very core of the right to
representation."). But cf. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (a "meaningful relationship"
between defendant and counsel is not required by the Sixth Amendment); Maria] v. Reynolds, 46
F.3ti 1055, 1060 (10th Cir. 1995); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 1985).
3" BINDER ET Al.., supra note 236, at 261 (emphasis in original).
36s Id.
"I See supra notes 92, 200 and accompanying text.
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than discuss strategy and options."7 Certainly, if an attorney takes that
approach to counseling, the result will be dissatisfied clients. Imagine
that after consulting a doctor about a medical condition, the doctor,
without taking any time to explain, simply told you what to do. It is
unlikely that you would be a satisfied patient. On the other hand, if
the doctor, or attorney, counsels with empathy and compassion, and
engages the patient, or client, in an active discussion which includes
opinions and the bases for those opinions, then client satisfaction
should be achieved since the client's decision will be the product of
informed counseling. 358
The dangers of paternalism, and the attorney's subordination of
her client, are very real and cause for great concern. Certainly, criminal
defendants can and do understand many of the complexities of their
cases, and arc the ones most acutely aware of the consequences and
gravity of all decisions."9 It is painfully ironic that for many defendants,
their attorneys serve only as another oppressive force that they must
endure. In Jones v. Barnes,"70 the Supreme Court held that appellate
counsel may choose not to raise points requested by the defendant.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that the majority's decision meant
that "[lin many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of the many indig-
nities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the
criminal justice system." 37 ' In what sounds like a paean to client-cen-
tered counseling, Justice. Brennan also observed that "today's ruling
denigrates the values of individual autonomy and dignity central to
many constitutional rights, especially those Fifth • and Sixth Amend-
ment rights that come into play in the criminal process. . . . The role
of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument
367 See supra notes 92, 200 and accompanying text.
56°Some commentators have argued that the perceived fairness of the process matters to
defendants just as much as do the outcomes. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, Slaving Their Day in
Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 L. & SOCY REV. 257 (1978);
Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experi-
ence, 18 C& SOC'Y Ray. 51 (1984). To a defendant in a criminal case faced with the realization
that an assertion of the constitutional right to a trial could result in au increased sentence, it is
unlikely that the process will ever seem fair and equitable. Still, if an attorney takes the time and
makes the effort to advise and attempt to persuade, the decisionntaking process should seem
more fair than if the attorney merely tells the client what to do, or instead declines to offer any
opinion.
569 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 576 (observing that advocates of client-centered
counseling "may improperly assume that clients are rational decisionmakers," but cautioning that
livie should be extremely suspicious of categorical judgments about client irrationality and
impaired decisionmaking capacity."); Charles Ogletree & Randy liens., The Ethical Dilemmas of
Public Defenders in Impact Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 23, 38-39 (1986).
57°463 U.S. 745 (1983).
571 Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the
criminal process."372 The present issue, attempting to persuade a client
to accept advice, is vastly different from the one raised in Barnes. The
attorney does not overrule, ignore or retain the final authority, but
rather attempts to persuade. Thee "ultimate authority" is, and must be,
the clefendant's. 373 The issue is not whether counsel prevailed upon her
client to accept her advice. What matters is that she provided her client
with the benefit of her advice, and attempted to explain and persuade
the wisdom of her view. In &ilia, defense counsel gave no advice on
the wisdom of accepting a plea. The court held that effective assistance
of counsel requires counsel to offer an informed opinion on the plea
decision. Iii an attempt to clarify its initial opinion, the court held
subsequently that by no means did the original opinion hold that
counsel was ineffective if she failed to convince a client to plead."' That
is quite a separate issue from whether counsel even has a duty to try
to convince a client to plead. It is the effort that should matter with
respect to counseling, not necessarily the result. Similarly, in State v.
Bristo1,375 the lawyer did no more than advise his client to "seriously
consider" the offer. In response to the defense argument that addi-
tional persuasion was required by the Sixth Amendinent, 576 the court
held that there was no authority for the position that an attorney who
fails to convince a client to plead provides ineffective assistance. 977
Again, the focus on the result is misplaced. As long as counsel made
efforts to persuade, that should' be sufficient. The court in Jones v.
Murray" made a similar leap of logic. The defendant claimed that
counsel was ineffective for failing to make any recommendation re-
garding the plea offer, as well as for not attempting to persuade him
to plead guilty. The court ignored the critical question of whether the
lawyer was required even to offer, an opinion on the desirability of the
plea bargain, and , held that counsel's decision "to refrain from a vig-
orous attempt to change his client's mind" was permissible. 379
372 1d. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
373 See id. at 751.
374 See Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) ('The initial opinion in this case did
not hold that it is constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when a lawyer's advice regard-
ing the wisdom of accepting or rejecting a plea offer fails to convince the client.").
375 618 A.2d 1290 (Vt. 1992).
376 In fact, the defense called expert witnesses, two highly regarded and experienced defense
attorneys, to testify as to the lengths to which they would have gone in an attempt to persuade
the client to accept the plea offer.
377 The court noted that the defendant "cites no cases supporting his contention that an
attorney who fails to persitade a client to accept a plea agreement violates the Strickland standard
of reasonable attorney competence." litistoi, 618 A.2d at 1292.
375 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991).
373 /d. at 1111,
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The concerns of paternalism that fuel much of client-centered
lawyering lead many to withhold their opinions or advice from clients.
Such a strategy is itself susceptible to allegations of paternalism. 3" The
decision to deny this information to a client rests on the assumption
that a client is incapable of listening, processing information and
making an informed choice."
It must also be acknowledged that many criminal defendants, for
a variety of reasons, are not well-suited to make such a critical choice.
Numerous studies establish undeniable links between crime and men-
tal illness, and the number of inmates with some form of mental
disability is extremely high. 382
 The prevalence of chronic alcohol
and/or drug abuse among inmates has been documented by countless
studies. 3" Given that the urban poor comprise the majority of those
who are incarcerated, 384 it is important to acknowledge the effects of
what has been referred to as socio-economic deprivation or "rotten
social background."3" Malnutrition, lead poisoning, inadequate medi-
3" See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 227, at 767 ("[T he lawyer's advice may affect the client not
by overpowering but by informing him.").
381 See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 227, at 767 ("It seems fair to say that a lawyer who avoids
giving advice to a client capable of assessing it is acting with disrespect towards her client by failing
to treat him as a competent person."); Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 577 ("1C1lient-centeredness
may be seen as condescending towards clients. Why should not poor clients, the original subjects
of client-centered practice, be able to receive advice from their lawyers without immediately
acceding to it?").
382 See, e.g., Torrey E. Fuller et al., Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally	 The Abuse of Jails
as Mental Hospitals, A Joint Report of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill and the Public
Citizen's Health Research Group (1992); H.R. Lamb & R.W. Grant, The Mentally Ill in an Urban
County Jail, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 17 (1982); John Petrich, Rate of Psychiatric Morbidity in
a Metropolitan County Jail Population, 133 A.m. J. PSYCHIATRY 1439 (1976); Linda A. Teplin,
Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders Among Incarcerated Women, 53 Alien. GEN. PSYCIIIATRY 505
(1996) (finding that 80% of her sample of women pretrial detainees met criteria for one or more
lifetime psychiatric disorders, and 70% were symptomatic within six months preceding her
interview of them); Fox Butterfield, By Default, Jails Become Mental Institutions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1998, at Al.
3" See, e.g., Associated Press, Drugs and Booze Big Crime Factors, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1998,
at 14; Christopher S. Wren, Connecticut Plan Would Cut Prison Time for Some Drug Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1998, at 131; Christopher S. Wren, Drugs or Alcohol Linked to 80% of Inmates, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al4 (discussing the findings of the National Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse).
334 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
3" In United States v. Alexaribler, the court grappled with the admissibility of what defense
counsel referred to as evidence of the defendant's "rotten social background." 471 F.2d 923, 959
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Writing in support of admitting the evidence, judge Bazelon noted the possibility
of a "significant causal relationship between violent criminal behavior and a 'rotten social back-
ground.'" Id. at 965. One scholar, addressing the implications of Alexander, discussed the effects
of various types of environmental deprivation on individuals. See Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social
Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3
J.L. & INEQUALITY 9 (1985).
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cal care and other by-products of environmental deficits can certainly
impact adversely on cognitive devclopment."6 All these conditions may
contribute in whole or in part to the possibility that a defendant may
be unable, or ill-equipped, to make a decision of this magnitude. 387
Even for those defendants unaffected by organic or physical im-
pairment, the stress of this critical decision can act as an inhibitor to
rational, careful dccisionmaking. 888 The medical analogy is once again
illustrative. It is easy to imagine the magnitude of the decision adversely
affecting someone's ability to choose among available options. One
scholar, confronted with the difficulty in deciding between medical
options available for his child, observed that when the decisionmaking
involves anxiety and outcomes that evoke strong emotions, the ability
to decide calmly and rationally is compromised."' The "assembly line"
nature of the criminal courts is also not conducive to calm reflection.s'J°
Cases are heard only briefly, and there is pressure to resolve the
charges quickly."' Defense counsel, accustomed to the pace and expe-
rienced in navigating through these obstacles, is often better able to
parse through the available alternatives and reach a conclusion as to
the best option.
It is important to recognize that it is far easier emotionally to
refrain from attempting to influence a client. In those cases where
counsel believes that the client's rejection of a plea offer is unwise,
counsel will be spared the unpleasant and painful task of trying to
convince someone to plead guilty. 392 This is an unrewarding endeavor.
It often creates conflict between lawyer and client. 393 Counsel is put in
the position of being the bearer of bad news, and of having her
386 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 385, at 35-36.
3" See, e.g., Alschulcr, supra note 99, at 1313 ("The principal vice of the guilty-plea system is
that it turns major consequences upon a single tactical decision, and few defendants seem truly
capable of making the decision for themselves.").
3811 See, e.g., G. Mandler, Stress and Thought Processes, in I1ANDBOOK OF STRESS: TIIEORETICAL
AND CLINICAL ASPECTS.
3" Simon, supra note 253, at 216-19. Professor Simon noted the "sense of deliverance" he
felt when the doctor informed him, "Wit the case of my own child, I decided to give blurt the
shot." Simon, supra note 253, at 217. lie stated further that "1 felt, and still do, that that sentence
was all that I needed or wanted to know." Simon, supra note 253, at 217.
I'm See, e.g., Zcidinan, supra note 92, at 898; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK Font.; REPoscr: Trot: COURTS (1967).
" I Certainly, part of the difficulty confronting the students and faculty in Dinerstein's case
was that they were given only four weeks to prepare for trial. See Dinerstein, supra note 249, at
972; see also Dinerstein, supra note 42, at 586 11.377.
332 See AMSTERDAM, supra note 272, at 339-40 ("(Clouirsel's difficult and painful responsi-
bilities include making every reasonable effort to save the defendant from the defendant's
ill-informed or ill-estimated choices.").
333 Set e.g., Alschuler, supra note 99.
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motivations and allegiances questioned by her client. Most public de-
fenders who have been in this situation arc familiar with being called
sellouts, functionaries or worse by their clients. Unlike when a trial
ends in an acquittal, there is no feeling of elation if counsel succeeds
in convincing the client to accept her advice. In fact, counsel and client
are usually left discontented. 394 From counsel's point of view, it would
be much easier when a client says, "I don't want to plead guilty to that
offer," to respond enthusiastically, "Great, let's go to trial." This re-
sponse, although easier emotionally, avoids the larger concern: in
counsel's judgment, a trial will result in a conviction and a greatly
enhanced punishment.
Certainly, there are defense attorneys who impose their will on
clients for invalid reasons and in overbearing, inappropriate ways. All
too often, the results of those encounters are guilty pleas. The deroga-
tory views of defendants toward their attorneys arc no doubt grounded
in the grim realities of courthouse regulars pleading everyone guilty
in order to earn a quick fee, to avoid the preparation and work
required by a trial and to appease the local criminal justice bureauc-
racy."y5 Nevertheless, it is equally dangerous for an attorney to stand
idly by when a client is set on a course that the attorney believes is
self-destructive.
My own eight years of experience as a staff, and then supervising,
attorney at a public defender office leads me to suggest the following
reasons why many defense attorneys do not intervene in their clients'
decisions whether to plead guilty or go to trial. Some adhere to the
principle of client autonomy and make conscious efforts to avoid
impacting the client's decisionmaking ability. For these defense attor-
neys, the goal of client empowerment motivates them to strive toward
creating an environment free from their influence, so that the client
can make a truly independent decision. Animated by the recognition
that "the defendant does the time, not me," the attorney seeks to
ensure client decisionmaking. It is debatable whether the criminal
court is the place for someone to become empowered. I am reminded
of an exchange at a public defender training. One lawyer stated that
he became a public defender precisely to fight against the assembly
line processing of guilty pleas, and that he would never try to persuade
"4 It is not so much about convincing someone who proclaims his innocence to plead guilty,
or persuading someone to give up his right to a trial. Often, the defendant wants not to plead
guilty, with the resulting sentence of imprisonment, rather than affirmatively wanting to go to
trial. Even so, the despondence remains.
395 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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someone to plead guilty. Another lawyer surmised that that lawyer
would have more clients in jail, serving longer sentences, than attor-
neys who intervened in their clients' decisions. 396
In cases where the lawyer believes that a plea is the best option
but the client decides on a trial, the defendant's professed innocence
often compels defense attorneys to keep their opinions to themselves.
There are defense attorneys who believe that once a client asserts
innocence, professional ethics or individual morality render plea dis-
cussions inappropriate. In Boria, the defendant's insistence upon his
innocence surely contributed to his attorney's reluctance to suggest
that he accept the plea offer. Protestations of innocence aside, how-
ever, plea discussions should continue. For one thing, defendants are
permitted to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, in order to avoid
harsher punishment. 397 Even when the defendant has a bona fide
defense, counsel may still advise a guilty plea. 398 There is also the
possibility that a defendant will change his mind. As the court observed
in Kates v. United Stales," "I have seen many a defendant, seemingly
utterly intransigent as to the possibility of pleading guilty, finally cave
in when confronted with the ugly reality of what probably would hap-
pen to him if he did not."' Given the well-documented lack of trust
between defendant and defense counse1, 401 it may well be the rare case
where the defendant admits guilt to his attorney. The civil context
presents an apt comparison. Imagine that a defendant in a civil lawsuit
tells the lawyer, "I did nothing wrong and will not settle." It is hard to
imagine that counsel would never, as a matter of counseling practice,
advise the client to accept a settlement offer.u2
"I For arguments that withholding advice is paternalistic and that neutrality is not actually
possible, see supra notes 380-81, 342-44 and accompanying text.
391
 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
398 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984).
3•°-'930 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
490 Id. at 192. The court in Jones a. Murray found that counsel's decision not to try to change
his client's mind, in the context of his client's professed innocence, was within the range of
professionally competent assistance. See 947 F.2d at 1111, In United States v. Gordon, 979 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the court considered whether counsel was required to recommend a plea
offer to a client who vigorously asserted his innocence. Apparently overlooking Boria, the court
stated, "Iwic found no case which holds that an effective defense lawyer in criminal cases must
offer advice on sentence-triggering pleas to a client who insists he is actually innocent of the
charges against him." Id. at 340. That, of course, was the precise situation in Baria. The defendant
proclaimed his innocence repeatedly, the offer involved a sentence of incarceration and the court
held that counsel was required to advise his client about the desirability of a plea.
4° 1 See, e.g., Zeiciman, supra note 92, at 890 n.132.
4 °2 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 7-7 (1992) provides
that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer." EC 7-7 goes on to
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A willingness to try to persuade involves the assumption of an
awesome amount of responsibility. Many lawyers arc simply loath to
take on such a burden."' Some prefer remaining detached rather than
getting involved in the emotions and anxiety that attend a decision of
this magnitude. Others arc motivated by fear of lawsuits or appeals
based on allegations of improper coercion. They believe that the more
the decision is the client's, the more they arc insulated from potential
Perhaps most important of all, many defense lawyers are not
invested in, and empathetic toward, their clients. To these attorneys,
the client is secondary. Take again the situation where counsel believes
that a decision to go to trial is disastrous. The attorney conveys a plea
offer and the client rejects it. Rather than intervene, counsel responds,
"Fine, let's go to trial." For this lawyer, a trial breaks up the drudgery
of defense work, is exciting, and in cases involving assigned counsel,
results in additional money. After trial, if, as expected by counsel, the
client is convicted and sentenced more severely than pursuant to thti.
plea offer, counsel is unaffected because it. was, after all, the defen-
dant's decision.
It is the attorneys who care fundamentally about their clients who
take an active role in decisionmaking. These are the attorneys who are
affected when they see someone receive a sentence far in excess of
what they had been offered. They are willing to put in the necessary
time, effort and commitment to conduct thorough factual and legal
preparation, and to expend the vast amount of energy often needed
during counseling of this nature. Return again to the scenario where
counsel believes that a plea is necessary to avoid disastrous conse-
state that counsel in criminal cases "has the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular
plea to a charge appears to be desirable," but that "it is for the client to decide what plea should
be entered." Some have argued that the severe potential repercussions and the specific constitu-
tional protections make client decisionmaking and autonomy particularly appropriate for crimi-
nal defendants. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 51, at 795-96; Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or
Officer of the Court, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65, 71 n.19. It is for precisely those reasons, among others,
that 1 believe that the lawyer has an obligation to be actively involved in the decisionmaking
process.
403
 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 253, at 225 ("The crude autonomy view is attractive to lawyers
because it absolves them of the burdens of connection and the responsibilities of power by
suggesting that they can perform their duties simply by presenting a professionally defined
package of information."); Spiegel, supra note 218, at 337 ( -The attractiveness of the autonomy
view can stem from its denial of responsibility and that is a substantial problem.").
4" See supra notes 281, 362 and accompanying text. Taken to its extreme, the attorney
relegates himself to being a conduit. fie passes along all relevant information but abstains from
imparting any opinions or advice.
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quences. Counsel conveys the offer and supplies her opinion and the
bases for that opinion, but the client declines to plead guilty. An
empathetic lawyer, motivated by concerns for her client, will, rather
than responding, "Great. Let's go to trial," intervene in the client's
decision and begin the process of trying to persuade. The ensuing
counseling is difficult. It is often unpleasant. It is almost always unre-
warding. Yet, she does it out of concern for her client.
It is threatening to many attorneys to take on this responsibility.
A lawyer who has not prepared adequately will be exposed by the
client's questions and resistance. An ill-prepared lawyer is vulnerable
to being called, accurately, a pawn or functionary by the client. If, on
the other hand, counsel has expended the necessary effort preparing
the case, the attorney can cope with the client's resistance and accusa-
tions. Even though it is cold comfort, the attorney knows that she has
the client's, not the court's, interests in mind.
It is important to emphasize that less common, but equally appli-
cable, will be occasions when the attempt to persuade is aimed at
convincing the client to reject a plea in favor of a trial. And it is
important also to bear in mind that the decision is, of course, ulti-
mately the client's. Unlike in Jones v. Barnes,"`' where counsel was given
the final authority to decide what issues should be raised on appeal,
counsel cannot override the client's decision whether to plead or not.
An attorney should not, and indeed cannot, enter a plea or go to trial
against a client's wishes." Truly effective assistance, however, requires
that attorneys attempt to convince clients to accept their advice. If the
counseling is done with empathy, compassion and understanding, it
should be the rare case where the client chooses to disagree. 407
CONCLUSION
The state of criminal defense has undergone consistent criticism,
and yet the appellate courts regularly reject ineffective assistance of
405 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
406 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.l (1977) (Burger, Cj., concurring) (the accused
has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his own behalf, or take an appeal). Indeed, in TRIAL
MANUAL 5, Professor Amsterdam begins his discussion of the lawyer's counseling obligations by
citing to Jones u Barnes and noting that the decision to plead must ultimately be left to the client's
wishes. "Counsel cannot plead a client guilty, or not guilty, against the client's will." AMSTERDAM,
supra note 272, at 339.
407 See, e.g., White, supra note 360, at 371 ("If the attorney has investigated the case thor-
oughly, and at the same time has worked closely with the client so as to develop a relationship
of trust and respect, the likelihood of inducing the defendant to accept an appropriate plea offer
increases dramatically.").
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counsel claims. Attention to the lawyer's counseling must supplement.
the exclusive focus on counsel's pretrial preparation and trial perform-
ance. The recognition that the overwhelming majority of the record
number of inmates in American penal institutions were convicted by
virtue of guilty pleas mandates this shift in emphasis. Delineating the
contours of counsel's constitutional counseling obligations is a long
overdue and vital task.
With scant guidance from the courts or professional ethical stand-
ards, defense lawyers' approaches to counseling clients as to the advis-
ability of accepting a plea offer range from neutrality to arm-twisting.
Clinical legal education, seeking to incorporate the ideals of autonomy
and empowering clients, embraces a client-centered model of counsel-
ing. Attorneys strive to portray and maintain neutrality so that deci-
sions will be made by the client, free from attorney influence.
The decision by the Second Circuit in Boria v. Keane, holding that
counsel's opinion as to the desirability of accepting or rejecting a
proffered plea comprises constitutionally required advice, has dra-
matic implications for the practice of criminal defense, as well as for
conceptions of client-centered counseling. This Article argues that
although the ruling in Boria was correct and will result in enhanced
effectiveness of counsel, the court did not go far enough. To breathe
life into the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance, the court
should have required attorneys to offer their opinions, and to attempt
LO convince clients to accept their recommendations.
Whether or not neutrality is a laudable goal, it is not possible to
achieve. Attorneys will convey what they believe a client should do by
the choices they make in what to present and how to present it.
Although posited as a response to lawyers' paternalistically telling their
clients what to do, neutrality, premised on notions that clients will be
unable to make independent judgments once their lawyer advises a
particular choice, treats clients as inherently incapable of listening to
advice, weighing it and reaching an autonomous decision. In order to
free clients from attorney influence, counsel withholds information—
her opinion—which might be important for the client to evaluate in
order to make a fully informed decision.
Once counsel provides an opinion, it becomes incumbent upon
her to explicate the bases for the opinion. Advice without the under-
lying justifications and rationales is of limited value to a client. In fact,
when we utilize the services of professionals, we expect and demand
the benefits of their training, experience, wisdom and advice. Criminal
defense lawyers in particular must take on the responsibility of advising
and attempting to persuade clients. Although most criminal defen-
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dams are well aware of the implications of the plea decision and,
obviously, are the ones who must suffer the consequences, the preva-
lence of mental illness, drug and alcohol use and addiction, and other
factors may result in an individual not being well-suited to make a
decision of this magnitude without the guidance and input of counsel.
The impact of the anxiety and stress that attend decisions of this
gravity, along with the pressure-packed atmosphere of criminal courts,
may also serve as inhibitors to careful, thoughtful and independent
decision making.
The attorney will be required to invest herself, to offer an opinion
and try to persuade, but not to usurp the decision from the client.
Ultimately it is, and must be, the client's choice. The attorney, however,
should assume the responsibility and take on the burden of advising
her client, with compassion and empathy, as to whether to accept or
reject a plea offer. By supplying the bases for her opinion, she should
try to persuade the client to accept her recommendation. The result
will be fully counseled decisionmaking based on truly effective assis-
tance of counsel.
